Czech Republic Corruption 

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Czech Republic perceived as being the third most corrupt country in the EU | Radio Prague International

There are three possible explanations for elite corruption in the Czech Republic.

Czech Republic Perceived As The Third Most Corrupt EU Country

Radio Prague International

Dublin Ireland Stabbing Of Children and Their Teacher 23rd November 2023 

 

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The current ministers in the Czech Republic.have shown little compunction at exploiting every opportunity for personal gain.

As it has become more entrenched and powerful, this Russian# m a f i a - i n t e l l i g e n c e network has exerted a corrupting influence
on Czech institutions.

"The response of most Czechs to continued corruption has been a retreat into passivity and continued acceptance of corruption as a norm.."

Postcommunist Malaise: A Context for Corruption In The Czech Republic
"..New freedoms have merely provided new avenues of profit for those in a position to exploit them..."
 
"Today, the Soldier Svejk is sowing the seeds of postcommunist corruption..."
 

Czech Republic Corruption Index Below On The www.inltv.co.uk webpage

Children for Sale: Croatia’s Corrupted Institutions Have Blessed Illegal Adoptions

Aurora Weiss Zagreb BIRN June 19, 2023
Croatia has shown no willingness to investigate the transnational organized crime of illegal adoptions from DR Congo and has, on the contrary, assisted it.
 
The INL News Group Has Secured An Exclusive Deal With Irish Eddie Paul McGuinness To Film A Documentary Of Mr McGuinness' Personal Experiences Of The Corruption In The Court System In The Czech Republic Which Will Be Titled
"My Czech Republic Court Nightmare"

"... Remember : All they do is to steal money from people that they control in the Czech Republic.

They can not do nothing to people they can't control i.e. outside the Czech Republic. "....  Irish Eddie Paul McGuinness

Irish Eddie Paul McGuinness

Emails have been sent to the Czech Republic Courts to request the Czech Republic Courts to take part in the proposed "My Czech Republic Court Nightmare" Documentary, which will name many of the corrupt Czech Judges.
So far no response has  been received by the Czech Republic Courts.
 
"If both sides are serious about enlargement, the challenge posed by endemic corruption must be faced head-on..."
 
"Following the release of the Transparency International index, a poll revealed that 52 percent of Czechs consider their nation to be corrupt. Over 40 percent also said that corruption has always existed, exists now, and will always exist, and that it is thus useless to try to fight it. Moreover, only 4 percent said they were ready to report corruption..."
 
" Not long afterward, Zdenek Machacek, the head of the UOOZ unit that specializes in investigating the Russian mafia, was arrested and detained on trumped up charges of blackmail. It is this latter case that is most informative here since the attorney representing the star witness against Machacek is a man named Josef Doucha.
Josef Doucha, a former police investigator, was Sloufs top choice for president of the police force. In 1996, as a UOOZ investigator, Doucha was criticized for cultivating contacts that exceeded the framework of police work with the Russian and Ukrainian mafias..."
 
 
If the Czech Republic Courts want to contact the INL News Group regarding the proposed "My Czech Republic Court Nightmare" Documentary, please send an email to:
INL World News
Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
 
"...This outcome, which at the time was hailed as a victory and a vindication for President Havel, must be examined more closely. Immediately after the investigation began, control over the BIS was shifted to Zemans protégé, Spidla. Notwithstanding this, the BIS has proven itself inept time and again.
Most importantly, it was later revealed that Vaclav Jakubik, the official who announced the conclusion of the investigation, is connected, through a chain of business partners and companies, to one of the most powerful and dangerous bosses of the Russian mafia, Sergei Mikhailov..."
 

Czech Republic perceived as being the third most corrupt country in the EU | Radio Prague International

A report by the international watchdog Transparency International suggests that the Czech Republic has a serious problem fighting corruption. With a corruption index of 4.3 out of an ideal 10, the Czech Republic is perceived as the third most corrupt country of the European Union.

Other newcomers to the EU have made progress in fighting corruption so what is the Czech Republic doing wrong - or rather -what has it failed to do? We called Michal Sticka of the Czech branch of Transparency International to find out.

"One of the most efficient tools to combat corruption in the political sphere would be an effective conflict-of-interests law. Political parties should be more transparent in financing their activities. When we look at bureaucracy, it should be said that the Czech Republic is still lacking a good civil service law that would govern the civil service sector and if we look at the judiciary, the main problem remains in insolvencies - we need to reform insolvency proceedings."

Now, we've said that this study is based on perception - perception of corruption in different countries - can you tell me how exactly it was conducted and how accurate it is, given the fact that it is based on perception alone?

"It should be said that there is no accurate tool with which to measure the level of corruption objectively. If you look at police or judicial statistics you will only get a notion of how the police and judiciary of a given country are able to prosecute crimes such as bribery. Therefore we need indirect tools and the CPI /Corruption Perception Index/ is one of the indirect tools which helps to measure the degree of corruption in a given country. It is based on data from various surveys conducted by renowned international organizations."

Where do these organizations get their own data from? Are people in the street asked if they think there is corruption in the Czech Republic or if they themselves have attempted to bribe anyone?

"The CPI is draws on data from organizations who survey academics, entrepreneurs and risk analysts, among others. Therefore there should be some elimination of the so called street bias. The street usually follows big scandals, it is usually very sensitive to media coverage of certain political scandals and the above mentioned target groups should be less prone to following the public outcry so to speak."

o what extent do you think reports such as this could damage the Czech Republic in the eyes of potential investors, for instance?

"The CPI score for the Czech Republic hasn't changed much since the beginning of this century so investors may have got used to the level of corruption in this country -given the flow of investments to the Czech Republic - on the other hand recent studies have shown that an increase of one point in the CPI index brings about a 15 percent rise in direct foreign investment to the country in question. So it is definitely better to make progress in curbing corruption - it really pays off."

"One economic sphere that mafia elements appear to have penetrated is the $3.6 billion in debt owed by the Russian government to the Czech government. Approximately $2.5 billion of this amount was retired in January of this year in a highly irregular transaction involving a very suspicious intermediary called Falkon Capital. Observers, including an array of journalists covering the deal in the two countries, as well as the French and Swiss secret services, suspect that the transaction may have been part of an melaborate money laundering scheme. The transaction itself was highly complex and shrouded in secrecy on all sides. The net result was that the Czech government received about twenty billion crowns (roughly $540 million) from Falkon and cancelled $2.5 billion of the debt owed by Russia. Although this represents a seem- ingly paltry 20 percent collection rate on the debt, it nonetheless represents 3 percent of the government’s election year budget...."
 
  PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTION IN THE CZECH R EPUBLIC
SAIS Review vol. XXII no. 2 (Summer–Fall 2002)
Jeffrey Jordan recently received his M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University-SAIS. This essay earned him first prize in the annual SAIS Review student essay contest. An earlier version of this essay appeared in Radio Free Europe’s online journal, East European Perspectives (Prague), 20 February/6 March 2002, <www.rferl.org>.
Patronage and Corruption in the Czech Republic
by Jeffrey M. Jordan
Corruption was endemic to the communist system of the Soviet bloc prior to its collapse in 1989, and Czechoslovakia was no exception. In the
postcommunist Czech Republic, corruption remains a deeply rooted problem.
A corrupt elite political and business class has emerged to exploit opportunities for illicit profit that are inherent in the process of postcommunist transition. Corruption has inflicted damage upon the Czech economy, prolonged the process of transition, and imposed costs on Czech taxpayers. It has also damaged democracy and for some, delegitimized the political system. There are three potential explanations for the continuation of elite corruption in the Czech Republic. 
First, preconditions amenable to corrupt behavior are still in place in the Czech Republic, as in other postcommunist countries. 
Second, high-level corruption lies in corrupt networks that are firmly embedded in the Czech government and have become worse over the past four years.
 Lastly, external corrupt networks, most notably the Russian mafia and intelligence services, effectively exploit the favorable conditions for corruption, to strengthen their own presence in the Czech Republic and to exert greater influence through- out the government.
Corruption was endemic to the communist system of the Soviet bloc prior to its collapse in 1989, and Czechoslovakia was no exception. This corruption generally arose from shortages inherent to the communist system, and usually took the form of bribery. Such behavior became generally accepted since, in a dysfunctional and illegitimate system, the rule of law was subordinate to the pursuit of personal well-being. This idea was encapsulated in the communist-era Czech axiom: “If you do not steal from the state, you rob your family.”
Corruption remains a deeply rooted malignancy in the postcommunist Czech Republic, and the problem has become increasingly serious, particularly in the past four years, under the current Social Democrat-led government. Transparency International, an anticorruption watchdog, underlined the seriousness of Czech corruption in its Corruption PerceptionsIndex1997,which ranked the Czechs twenty-seventhout of fifty-two countries.1In 2001, the Czech Republic dropped toforty-seventh out of ninety-one countries surveyed. More to the point, in 1997, the Czechs were tied with the Belgians; now they are tied with the Bulgarians. 2
Ironically, the government that has overseen this backsliding was elected on an anticorruption platform and has implemented an official, though largely ineffectual,Clean Handscampaign.
Administrative corruption still persists as it did during the period of communism. Poorly paid bureaucrats demand bribes to augment their incomes and bribe-payers have come to view the practice as a normal cost of doing business. However, while communist-era corruption was largely driven by shortages, the desire to subvert the state, and the occasional need to bribe an obstinate bureaucrat, corruption in the postcommunist Czech Republic has often coincided with market-oriented reforms. The transition to a market economy, characterized by partially implemented reforms and systemic ambiguity, created huge opportunities for well-placed politicians, bureaucrats, and their
cronies to exploit lingering market distortions for their own benefit.
This occurred on an enormous scale, enriching a few and leaving Czech taxpayers with the bill.
From the lowest level of functionaries to the highest level of official governance, a considerable part of the Czech bureaucracy is infected with corruption. At the top levels, the stakes are extremely high and opportunities abound for the entrepreneurial politician to benefit from the privatization of remaining state-controlled industries, the awarding of pubic contracts, or from simply turning a blind eye toward the misdeeds of other profiteers.
Sadly, those few who have remained above the fray, such as President Vaclav Havel, have been discounted as astute moralists, but ineffectual politicians.
 
 Meanwhile, postrevolution euphoria has faded into disillusion as the country that seemed to harbor the greatest potential to transform itself into a normal Western country after 1989 regresses into its old communist habits. According to Freedom House, a human rights group, corruption in the Czech Republic has long passed the stage of occasional unrelated bribes to government officials.

Rather, it exists on a national scale as a sophisticated enterprise that is parallel with public service.3

There are three possible explanations for elite corruption in the Czech Republic.
 
 First, preconditions amenable to corrupt behavior are still in place in the Czech Republic, as in other postcommunist countries. Lingering problems and widespread habits, overlaid with new freedoms, have made the Czech Republic a fertile ground for corruption. Membership in the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and prospective membership in the European Union (EU) have yet to curb corrupt behavior, as the Czechs have been content to reap the benefits of these institutions without fully adopting their practices. In fact, the Czechs have become increasingly ambivalent toward their affiliation with these institutions. 
 
The second explanation for high-level corruption lies in power politics. Corrupt networks are firmly embedded in the Czech government. The very nature of the currentOpposition Agreement between the Social Democrats and the Civic Democrats, by which the Social Democrats have been able to govern, is a recipe for corruption, and has allowed a communist-crony network within the Social Democratic party to gain influence in the government. 
 
Lastly, external corrupt networks, most notably the Russian mafia and intelligence services, effectively exploit these favorable conditions for corruptionincluding the ascendancy of old-guard communists in the governmentto strengthen their presence in the Czech Republic and to exert greater influence throughout the Czech government
 
Czech Republic country risk report — GAN Integrity

???????? Czech Republic risk report

Updated: Thursday, November 5, 2020

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Corruption can impede business in a number of sectors in the Czech Republic; corruption risks in the public procurement sector are perceived to be especially high, but many other sectors, including the public administration, carry moderate corruption risks. Patronage and nepotism are considered especially problematic in the country. The Criminal Code criminalizes attempted corruption, extortion, active and passive bribery, bribery of foreign officials and money laundering. The Czech Republic prohibits facilitation payments and any gift given with the intent to illegally influence decision-making may be considered a bribe. Criminal liability for legal entities covers domestic and foreign corporate entities registered in the Czech Republic. Nonetheless, the government does not implement the legal anti-corruption framework effectively. Although the majority of citizens do not encounter petty corruption in their daily lives, bribes or gifts are occasionally needed to speed up public administration processes.

There are three possible explanations for elite corruption in the Czech Republic.
"The current ministers in the Czech Republic.have shown little compunction at exploiting every opportunity for personal gain..."...

Patronage and Corruption in the Czech Republic by Jerrfrey M. Jordan

Administrative corruption still persists as it did during the period of communism. Poorly paid bureaucrats demand bribes to augment their incomes and bribe-payers have come to view the practice as a normal cost of doing business. However, while communist-era corruption was largely driven by shortages, the desire to subvert the state, and the occasional need to bribe an obstinate bureaucrat, corruption in the postcommunist Czech Republic has often coincided with market-oriented reforms. The transition to a market economy, characterized by partially implemented reforms and systemic ambiguity, created huge opportunities for well-placed politicians, bureaucrats, and their
cronies to exploit lingering market distortions for their own benefit.
This occurred on an enormous scale, enriching a few and leaving Czech taxpayers with the bill.
From the lowest level of functionaries to the highest level of official governance, a considerable part of the Czech bureaucracy is infected with corruption. At the top levels, the stakes are extremely high and opportunities abound for the entrepreneurial politician to benefit from the privatization of remaining state-controlled industries, the awarding of pubic contracts, or from simply turning a blind eye toward the misdeeds of other profiteers.
Sadly, those few who have remained above the fray, such as President Vaclav Havel, have been discounted as astute moralists, but ineffectual politicians.
 
 Meanwhile, postrevolution euphoria has faded into disillusion as the country that seemed to harbor the greatest potential to transform itself into a normal Western country after 1989 regresses into its old communist habits. According to Freedom House, a human rights group, corruption in the Czech Republic has long passed the stage of occasional unrelated bribes to government officials.

Rather, it exists on a national scale as a sophisticated enterprise that is parallel with public service.3

There are three possible explanations for elite corruption in the Czech Republic.
 
 First, preconditions amenable to corrupt behavior are still in place in the Czech Republic, as in other postcommunist countries. Lingering problems and widespread habits, overlaid with new freedoms, have made the Czech Republic a fertile ground for corruption. Membership in the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and prospective membership in the European Union (EU) have yet to curb corrupt behavior, as the Czechs have been content to reap the benefits of these institutions without fully adopting their practices. In fact, the Czechs have become increasingly ambivalent toward their affiliation with these institutions. 
 
The second explanation for high-level corruption lies in power politics. Corrupt networks are firmly embedded in the Czech government. The very nature of the currentOpposition Agreement between the Social Democrats and the Civic Democrats, by which the Social Democrats have been able to govern, is a recipe for corruption, and has allowed a communist-crony network within the Social Democratic party to gain influence in the government. 
 
Lastly, external corrupt networks, most notably the Russian mafia and intelligence services, effectively exploit these favorable conditions for corruptionincluding the ascendancy of old-guard communists in the governmentto strengthen their presence in the Czech Republic and to exert greater influence throughout the Czech government

Judicial system Moderate risk

There is a moderate risk of corruption when dealing with the judiciary. Bribes and irregular payments in return for favorable judicial decisions are common (GCR 2015-2016). Corruption within the judiciary is said to be "very sophisticated", making it hard to detect (FitW 2016). The judiciary is constitutionally independent and in practice, the court operates independently, but political influence in high profile cases has occasionally been a problem (NiT 2017BTI 2016). There are concerns about career advancement of judges happening in a non-transparent manner (GRECO 2016). Approximately two out of five companies rate the independence of judges as fairly bad or very bad (JS 2017). Companies are broadly dissatisfied with the efficiency of the legal framework in relation to settling disputes and challenging regulations (GCR 2017-2018). Companies should be aware that decisions may vary from court to court (ICS 2017). A new Civil Code was introduced alongside the existing Penal Code without a procedural law explaining how the two laws should be applied, leading to problems in the application of the law (ICS 2017). Court proceedings move slowly and many judges lack familiarity with commercial and intellectual property cases (ICS 2017).

Enforcing a contract is significantly more costly and slightly more time-consuming in the Czech Republic compared to the OECD high-income average (DB 2018). The Czech Republic is a state party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and it is also a member of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

Police Moderate risk

There is a moderate risk of corruption when dealing with the Czech police. Businesses have sufficient trust in the reliability of the police services (GCR 2017-2018). Nevertheless, more than half of surveyed businesses pay for security (ES 2013). More than half of citizens perceive the police as corrupt (European Commission, Feb. 2014). Less than one in ten report to have paid a bribe to traffic officers (GCB 2016). Corruption among the security forces is a problem; in 2015, the police investigated 174 cases of corruption among its own forces (HRR 2016).

Public services High risk

The Czech public administration carries a moderate to high risk of corruption. Bribes and irregular payments when dealing with public services sometimes occur (GCR 2015-2016); one in ten companies report expecting to give gifts to "get things done" (ES 2013). More than two-thirds of companies perceive nepotism and patronage to be a problem (European Commission, Feb. 2014), with a significant majority believing that bribery and the use of connections are the easiest way to obtain a public service (European Commission, Feb. 2014). Almost two in every ten surveyed households perceive local public officials to be corrupt and less than one in ten report to have paid a bribe to obtain official documents (GCB 2016). Inefficient government bureaucracy is cited as the second most problematic factor for doing business in the Czech Republic (GCR 2017-2018). Businesses also cite inconsistent competition policies among the deterrents to investment (ICS 2017).

Starting a business in the Czech Republic takes almost twice as many steps compared to the OECD high-income average (DB 2018). Similarly, obtaining a construction permit also takes nearly twice as many steps and a significantly longer time compared to the average among OECD high-income countries (DB 2018).

Land administration Low risk

The land and construction sector poses a moderate to low corruption risk for businesses operating in the Czech Republic. Private property rights are generally well-defined and respected by the government (BTI 2016). Companies report moderate confidence in the government's ability to protect property rights (GCR 2017-2018). Only a small percentage of companies expect to give gifts in order to obtain a construction permit (ES 2013). Companies should note that the process of tracing the history of property and land acquisition can be complex and time-consuming (ICS 2017). Expropriation is only possible when done for public purposes and in a non-discriminatory manner in compliance with international law (ICS 2017). The new Civil Code has clarified the treatment of property rights and what constitutes 'public purposes' in expropriation cases (BTI 2016).

Registering a property takes slightly longer than the OECD high-income average (DB 2018).

Tax administration Moderate risk

The tax administration poses a moderate risk of corruption. Businesses report that irregular payments and bribes when making tax payments are uncommon (GCR 2015-2016); virtually no companies indicate they give gifts when making tax payments (ES 2013). As revealed by statistics from the Supreme Public Prosecutor, tax fraud is among the most occurring financial crimes (ICS 2017). A third of businesses indicate that they perceive tax fraud to be common (EU Barometer 2014). A number of initiatives have led to increased capabilities in the tax administration for detecting tax fraud, including the ability to detect foreign bribery cases (OECD 2017 Phase 4 Report).

Companies spend significantly more time on filing taxes each year than in other OECD high-income countries (DB 2018).

Customs administration Low risk

There is a moderate to low risk of corruption when dealing with the Czech customs administration. Businesses report that irregular payments and bribes are uncommon in customs procedures (GETR 2016). Fewer than one in ten businesses report expecting to give gifts when obtaining an import license (ES 2013). Businesses are satisfied with the efficiency and time-predictability of the clearance process (GETR 2016). Burdensome import procedures and tariffs are cited as among the most problematic factors for importing (GETR 2016).

The average time and cost required to deal with exports and imports are far below OECD high-income averages (DB 2018).

Public procurement Very high risk

There is a high risk of corruption in the Czech Republic's public procurement sector. Over two-thirds of businesses consider corruption to be widespread in national and local public procurement (European Commission 2014). The energy, rail, forestry and postal services are particularly susceptible to undue influence and conflicts of interest (EUACR 2014). Irregular payments and bribes in the process of awarding public contracts and licenses are perceived to be very common (GCR 2015-2016). Companies report high levels of favoritism in decisions of procurement officials and frequent diversion of public funds (GCR 2017-2018). Among the main corruption risks are customized criteria for certain bidders, closing a deal on a contract before the specifications for a call for tender have been identified, and abuse of emergency grounds to justify the use of non-competitive procedures (European Commission, Feb. 2014). In 2014, a fifth of contracts were granted without a call for tender and another fifth were awarded in tenders with only a single bidder (OECD 2016). According to a recent analysis carried out by the NGO zIndex, sponsors of political parties received contracts worth USD 19.5 billion, and companies owned by political donors acquired 40% to 60% more public contracts than companies owned by non-donors (zIndex 2015). Companies are generally able to compete on the same terms as state-owned enterprises (SOEs), but there are frequent accusations that large domestic firms (both private firms and SOEs) are able to use their political clout to gain unfair advantages (ICS 2017). Public Procurement is primarily regulated by Act. No. 134/2016. Tenders are required for acquiring services and supplies exceeding CZK 2 million and construction work exceeding CZK 6 million (ICS 2017).

In one corruption case, an aide to former Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek had been charged for demanding a multi-million dollar bribe from a foreign company in return for a government defense procurement contract (Reuters, Feb. 2016). After a lengthy trial, including a conviction which was overturned, but ultimately reinstated by the country's Supreme Court, the aide was handed a five-year jail sentence (Radio Praha, May. 2017).

Legislation

The Criminal Code criminalizes attempted corruption, extortion, active and passive bribery, bribery of foreign officials and money laundering. Money laundering is also regulated under Act No. 253/2008 Coll. There is no exception for facilitation payments under Czech law (CMS 2016). There is no specific threshold for hospitality expenses, but any gift given with the intent to illegally influence decision-making can be considered a bribe (GCN 2016). For officials, penalties for bribery and abuse of power can be up to 12 years in prison, forfeiture of property, monetary penalties, and a number of other measures (CMS 2016). Anti-corruption laws are not always effectively implemented, and government officials often engage in corruption with impunity (HRR 2016; ICS 2017). The OECD has noted that there is an absence of prosecutions for foreign bribery, despite the high risk of bribery in sectors such as export of machinery and defense materials (OECD 2017 Phase 4 Report). Private sector bribery is criminalized (CMS 2016). Companies and high management can be held liable for corrupt acts by their employees, provided the company benefited from the act (CMS 2016). Penalties for companies include fines, forfeiture of property, disqualification from participating in public tenders and receiving subsidies (CMS 2016). Companies can be exonerated from criminal liability if they can prove they "have made every effort that may be reasonably expected to prevent the commission of a criminal offense" (Lexology, Feb. 2017). In February 2017, a company was exonerated from charges of illegal conduct in public procurement because it has implemented an ethics code (Lexology, Feb. 2017). Legislators, members of the cabinet, and public officials are required by the Conflict of Interests Act 2006 to annually declare their assets. Asset information can be viewed by sending a written request, but the provided information often lacks sufficient detail. A conflict-of-interest law, passed in 2017, limits the business activities of government ministers; its effects are unclear as of the time of review (NiT 2017). The Law on Civil Service prohibits political interference in the public administration and operations of state-owned enterprises (ICS 2017). The Contract Register Act requires all contracts related to the disbursement of public resources and property, as well as some private law contracts when certain public bodies are a party to a contract exceeding CZK 50,000 in value (Lexology, Jul. 2016). There is no comprehensive whistleblower protection legislation and whistleblower protection is inadequate (ICS 2017; Lexology, Jan. 2017).

The Czech Republic has signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) as well as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

Civil society

Freedoms of speech and of the press are guaranteed by the Constitution of the Czech Republic and are respected by the government (HRR 2016). Politicians sometimes use hostile rhetoric against media outlets (FotP 2016). There are concerns about ownership concentration among a small group of wealthy businessmen (FotP 2016). A conflict-of-interest law passed in 2017 includes restrictions on media ownership among members of the government (NiT 2017). Freedom of information is guaranteed under the law (FotP 2016). NGOs have reported difficulties and reluctance among officials to release information relating to the salaries of public officials, public tenders, and other uses of public finances (HRR 2016). The media environment is considered 'free' (FotP 2017).

Freedoms of assembly and of association are protected by the Constitution and are also respected in practice (HRR 2016). Civil society is well developed and varied with many forms of civil society organizations (BTI 2016). National, regional and local authorities reportedly cooperate with civil society actors (BTI 2016). The Czech non-governmental sector suffers from a lack of funding and is largely dependent on public funding (NiT 2017). Implementation of programs that would draw on EU structural funds has been delayed (NiT 2017). With the support of national businesses and international donors, more than 20 NGOs launched an anti-corruption campaign named the "Reconstruction of the State" (BTI 2016)

Sources

  • Czech State', 27 March 2013.

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Children for Sale: Croatia’s Corrupted Institutions Have Blessed Illegal Adoptions

Aurora Weiss Zagreb BIRN June 19, 2023
 
Croatia has shown no willingness to investigate the transnational organized crime of illegal adoptions from DR Congo and has, on the contrary, assisted it.

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Back to the Future: Czechia’s Stuttering Fight Against Corruption | Balkan Insight
 
ODS leader Petr Fiala (C), STAN leader Vit Rakusan (L) and then-PM Andrej Babis (R) prepare for radio debate during parliamentary elections at Czech Radio in Prague, Czech Republic, 08 October 2021. EPA-EFE/MARTIN DIVISEK
 
Tim Gosling   Prague   BIRN   July 31, 2023
 
Former Czech PM Andrej Babis (C) attends a protest by trade unions members against the pension reform outside the Office of the Government in Prague, Czech Republic, 29 March 2023.
ODS leader and now PM Petr Fiala (R) and STAN leader and now Deputy PM Vit Rakusan (L) prepare for a radio debate for the parliamentary elections at Czech Radio in Prague, Czech Republic, 08 October 2021.
 
 
The governing coalition stormed into office in 2021 on the back of promises to reverse a culture of corruption and nepotism that had flourished under the previous government. Yet the results so far have been disappointing, argues Transparency International.

It was headline news all over the Czech Republic when the police announced it had broken up an organised crime group that had been seeking bribes in return for contracts from Prague’s public transport operator, DPP. At its centre was the city’s deputy mayor, Petr Hlubucek, of the coalition Mayors and Independents party (STAN).

Although its heady mix of high politics, mafia, drugs and public property sounded like a toxic cocktail from the post-Communist 1990s, the Dosimeter scandal, as it became known, actually blew up in June last year. Unfortunately, the government’s response has been similarly unevolved, argues Ondrej Kopecny, who heads the local office of the anti-corruption advocacy group Transparency International.

The subsequent probe revealed that Michal Redl, a mafia-linked middle man implicated in the scandal, enjoyed significant influence throughout the centre-right coalition party.

“The patterns remain the same,” Ondrej Kopecny tells BIRN during an interview in TI’s distinctly unglamorous office above a post office in the gritty Palmovka neighbourhood of Prague. “When it comes to public companies handing out billions in contracts, there are business and political figures that expect their share.”

What was most disappointing, he adds, was the government’s reaction, which saw the five coalition parties swiftly circle the wagons.

When the ties to Redl came to light, Stanislav Polcak, a leading Stan MEP, voluntarily suspended his party membership (he then quietly reactivated it in March), while Petr Gazdik, a leading light in STAN, resigned his post as education minister though not his seat in parliament, while declaring: “I do not feel guilty in any way.”

Noting that Gazdik was “neither accused nor investigated”, Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala labelled the resignation “an honest solution”. Alongside the rest of the coalition, he rallied to defend Vit Rakusan, the deputy prime minister and interior minister who, as STAN leader, had failed to keep the mob-linked Redl from gaining so much influence in the party.

“There was some change compared with past governments, but if we talk about political integrity, they didn’t raise the bar by much,” laments Kopecny.

Missing links

There has been some progress towards improving transparency over the past 18 months, Kopecny concedes, but as the Dosimeter scandal illustrates, not nearly enough.

June 16, 2022 illustrated this ambiguity. On the one hand, the government pushed through a bill tightening conflict-of-interest rules; on the other, GRECO, the Council of Europe’s anti-corruption unit, issued a damning report.

The tightened conflict of interest regulations, which ANO and the far-right Freedom and Democracy party (SPD) sought to block, will ban all politicians from owning media outlets starting from next year. Companies owned by members of the government will also be prevented from seeking state subsidies.

The previous rules, introduced in 2017 and branded “lex Babis”, blocked politicians and government members from “controlling” such assets. This saw the billionaire put his Agrofert conglomerate into trusts headed by his wife and his lawyer.

The EU, for one, claimed the prime minister still retained influence over these assets during his time in office, and so froze millions of euros in funds to Czechia due to this conflict of interest. The recently amended legislation will, starting in 2024, apply limits to “beneficial ownership”.

“It’s good that they tightened the legislation,” Kopecny admits, though asserts that it’s a crucial weakness in Czechia’s conflict-of-interest regime that companies owned by politicians can still take part in public procurement.

The GRECO report, meanwhile, bemoans the fact that just two of 14 recommendations it made in 2021 on preventing corruption among lawmakers, judges and prosecutors have been fully implemented.

It complains that, among other missing components, there’s still no ethical code for MPs regarding gifts or benefits, or any law governing lobbying. Kopecny pinpoints to the latter as a glaring hole. To maintain public trust, he insists, politicians must be transparent about whom they’re meeting.

Shoring up the independence of prosecutors is another missing piece of the rule-of-law jigsaw, despite pre-election promises. At present, the government of the day can hire or fire the chief state prosecutor at will, without criteria or reference to institutions such as the Constitutional Court.

Meanwhile, it took a fine of 54 million koruna (2.15 million euros) levied by the EU for missing a 2021 deadline to push through legislation for the protection of whistleblowers, which will now take effect this summer.

But Kopecny criticises the quality of the new law, which he calls a “missed opportunity”. Most crucially, he points out, the possibility to file anonymous reports is not included in the bill, “which makes the law much less effective, especially when dealing with bigger cases.”

And that’s no oversight, he suspects: “Across the political spectrum, politicians are afraid of transparency. They see it as potentially dangerous to themselves, and they also worry that it could be used by their competitors.”

Former Czech PM Petr Necas arrives for the questioning at the headquarters of the Unit for Combating Organized Crime in Prague, Czech Republic, on 12 July 2013.

Lack of enthusiasm

It’s Fiala and Co’s obvious lack of enthusiasm that is perhaps most worrying for those hoping to see an improvement in Czechia’s rule of law.

Without genuine political will to increase transparency, the government’s anti-corruption pledges are little more than a repetition of the political marketing on which the system has been running for decades.

Many worried that could prove to be the case when the ODS – which saw its support plummet when its last premier, Petr Necas, left office in 2013 amid a welter of accusations both political and personal in nature – returned to office.

“There’s very little self-reflection on the part of the ODS,” Kopecny says. “They look at the fall of Necas – which came about because the prime minister’s lover used military intelligence to spy on his wife – and still seem to feel it was all a plot.”

He points again at the tepid response to the Dosimeter scandal. Or the ongoing fuss around Pavel Blazek, the old-school ODS justice minister and his role in a public housing scandal in Brno.

That issue is testing the unity of the coalition. The Pirate Party, a junior coalition partner,  is demanding Blazek resign over suspicions he has been using his office to interfere with the investigation – actions that the progressive party says “threaten public trust in the rule of law and the fulfilment of the government’s stated policy goals”.

However, Fiala and his party have dismissed the accusations outright. The prime minister insists that Blazek has explained all – although only to him – and in his role is “strengthening respect” for the law.

But many remain unconvinced, and worry that there’s little chance that the “anti-Babis coalition” will deliver the kind of systemic approach required to uproot Czechia’s longstanding corruption networks.

“I think [improvement] will take some time, simply because this system has been entrenched in the Czech Republic for almost 30 years now,” political analyst Jiri Pehe told Czech Radio in May, following Czechia’s ranking as second only to Russia on a global “Crony Capitalism Index”. 

“Some of the billionaires who are now playing significant economic and political roles in the Czech Republic have sort of been legitimised by the fact that nothing has been done against them and so it will be an uphill battle,” he continued. “I don’t think that much will be done given the current composition of the government in which the lead role is played by the [ODS], which actually presided over all of this in the 1990s.”

Czech Republic perceived as being the third most corrupt country in the EU

10/19/2005
 
Czech Republic perceived as being the third most corrupt country in the EU
 
Length of audio 29:00
 

A report by the international watchdog Transparency International suggests that the Czech Republic has a serious problem fighting corruption. With a corruption index of 4.3 out of an ideal 10, the Czech Republic is perceived as the third most corrupt country of the European Union.

Other newcomers to the EU have made progress in fighting corruption so what is the Czech Republic doing wrong - or rather -what has it failed to do? We called Michal Sticka of the Czech branch of Transparency International to find out.

"One of the most efficient tools to combat corruption in the political sphere would be an effective conflict-of-interests law. Political parties should be more transparent in financing their activities. When we look at bureaucracy, it should be said that the Czech Republic is still lacking a good civil service law that would govern the civil service sector and if we look at the judiciary, the main problem remains in insolvencies - we need to reform insolvency proceedings."

Now, we've said that this study is based on perception - perception of corruption in different countries - can you tell me how exactly it was conducted and how accurate it is, given the fact that it is based on perception alone?

"It should be said that there is no accurate tool with which to measure the level of corruption objectively. If you look at police or judicial statistics you will only get a notion of how the police and judiciary of a given country are able to prosecute crimes such as bribery. Therefore we need indirect tools and the CPI /Corruption Perception Index/ is one of the indirect tools which helps to measure the degree of corruption in a given country. It is based on data from various surveys conducted by renowned international organizations."

Where do these organizations get their own data from? Are people in the street asked if they think there is corruption in the Czech Republic or if they themselves have attempted to bribe anyone?

"The CPI is draws on data from organizations who survey academics, entrepreneurs and risk analysts, among others. Therefore there should be some elimination of the so called street bias. The street usually follows big scandals, it is usually very sensitive to media coverage of certain political scandals and the above mentioned target groups should be less prone to following the public outcry so to speak."

To what extent do you think reports such as this could damage the Czech Republic in the eyes of potential investors, for instance?

"The CPI score for the Czech Republic hasn't changed much since the beginning of this century so investors may have got used to the level of corruption in this country -given the flow of investments to the Czech Republic - on the other hand recent studies have shown that an increase of one point in the CPI index brings about a 15 percent rise in direct foreign investment to the country in question. So it is definitely better to make progress in curbing corruption - it really pays off."

Author: Daniela Lazarová  
 
There are three possible explanations for elite corruption in the Czech Republic.
"The current ministers in the Czech Republic.have shown little compunction at exploiting every opportunity for personal gain..."...

Patronage and Corruption in the Czech Republic by Jerrfrey M. Jordan

Administrative corruption still persists as it did during the period of communism. Poorly paid bureaucrats demand bribes to augment their incomes and bribe-payers have come to view the practice as a normal cost of doing business. However, while communist-era corruption was largely driven by shortages, the desire to subvert the state, and the occasional need to bribe an obstinate bureaucrat, corruption in the postcommunist Czech Republic has often coincided with market-oriented reforms. The transition to a market economy, characterized by partially implemented reforms and systemic ambiguity, created huge opportunities for well-placed politicians, bureaucrats, and their
cronies to exploit lingering market distortions for their own benefit.
This occurred on an enormous scale, enriching a few and leaving Czech taxpayers with the bill.
From the lowest level of functionaries to the highest level of official governance, a considerable part of the Czech bureaucracy is infected with corruption. At the top levels, the stakes are extremely high and opportunities abound for the entrepreneurial politician to benefit from the privatization of remaining state-controlled industries, the awarding of pubic contracts, or from simply turning a blind eye toward the misdeeds of other profiteers.
Sadly, those few who have remained above the fray, such as President Vaclav Havel, have been discounted as astute moralists, but ineffectual politicians.
 
 Meanwhile, postrevolution euphoria has faded into disillusion as the country that seemed to harbor the greatest potential to transform itself into a normal Western country after 1989 regresses into its old communist habits. According to Freedom House, a human rights group, corruption in the Czech Republic has long passed the stage of occasional unrelated bribes to government officials.

Rather, it exists on a national scale as a sophisticated enterprise that is parallel with public service.3

There are three possible explanations for elite corruption in the Czech Republic.
"If both sides are serious about enlargement, the challenge posed by endemic corruption must be faced head-on..."
 
 First, preconditions amenable to corrupt behavior are still in place in the Czech Republic, as in other postcommunist countries. Lingering problems and widespread habits, overlaid with new freedoms, have made the Czech Republic a fertile ground for corruption. Membership in the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and prospective membership in the European Union (EU) have yet to curb corrupt behavior, as the Czechs have been content to reap the benefits of these institutions without fully adopting their practices. In fact, the Czechs have become increasingly ambivalent toward their affiliation with these institutions. 
 
The second explanation for high-level corruption lies in power politics. Corrupt networks are firmly embedded in the Czech government. The very nature of the currentOpposition Agreement between the Social Democrats and the Civic Democrats, by which the Social Democrats have been able to govern, is a recipe for corruption, and has allowed a communist-crony network within the Social Democratic party to gain influence in the government. 
 
Lastly, external corrupt networks, most notably the Russian mafia and intelligence services, effectively exploit these favorable conditions for corruptionincluding the ascendancy of old-guard communists in the governmentto strengthen their presence in the Czech Republic and to exert greater influence throughout the Czech government
 
Postcommunist Malaise: A Context for Corruption In The Czech Republic
"..New freedoms have merely provided new avenues of profit for those in a position to exploit them..."
 
Corruption has taken deep root in the Czech Republic as a result of the “postcommunist malaise” that affects all countries undergoing postcommunist transition. In the Czech context, this mal-
aise takes on a peculiarly national flavor when combined with a growing ambivalence toward the West and the responsibilities that 22
“rejoining the West” entails. Postcommunist malaise is generally described as the dissonance between the forty years of austerity experienced throughout the Eastern Bloc’s communist systems and the new freedoms thrust upon these ill-prepared societies in 1989.
These transitioning countries have come to find out that unbridled freedom is not the cure for a postcommunist hangover. In the Czech Republic, these problems pervade the political and economic spheres.
People do not change overnight; and the same corrupt practices that were acceptable during communism do not simply vanish with the appearance of liberal democracy and a market-based
economy. New freedoms have merely provided new avenues of profit for those in a position to exploit them. Moreover, the ad- ministrators of the market economy, both in business and in gov-
ernment, are often the same individuals who pulled the levers of power in communist Czechoslovakia. The common perception is that the rule of law has failed to adequately regulate the workings of this new system, and that those in power can unscrupulously manipulate the laws to their own benefit. This view is summed up in a 1999 headline in the Czech newspaper, Lidove noviny: “Czechs have reached the conclusion that the state will not protect them from lawlessness.”4 The article goes on to say that a growing number of Czechs have no faith in the justice system and no trust in the government. In fact, 70 percent of respondents to a survey last year indicated their belief that the country is run by organizedcrime. 5
The Czech economy suffers from this postcommunist hangover as well. Forty years of Soviet domination left the Czech Republic with a dysfunctional economy and the colossal challenge
of transforming it into a functioning marketplace. Sadly, government attempts to bring about an effective transformation have only served to prolong the hangover. Indeed, the privatization of Czech enterprises often worked to directly benefit the former communist leaders and their cronies, who were able to grab state assets on the cheap. Conversely, schemes to distribute ownership of state assets to the public, such as Vaclav Klaus’s voucher privatization, gave people only the illusion of participation. In re-
 
New freedoms have merely provided new avenues of profit for those in a position to exploit them
 
In reality, absent the effective rule of business law or common recognition of private property rights, the door remained open to fraud perpetrated by financially savvy “entrepreneurs.”6 In sum, Czech privatization efforts have been a disaster for the national economy, and the current government is still dealing with the macro-economic results of these decisions. 7
Furthermore, the government is under intense pressure to generate cash flow for its own budget and to assist Czech enterprises in remaining afloat. Domestically, politicians face a discontented electorate that is nostalgic for the communist social safety net and frustrated by unmet expectations of economic growth and rising living standards. Yet the government must also work to reduce budget deficits and undertake further economic reform in time to qualify for the first wave of EU enlargement. Readily available, if nonrecurring, sources of income lie in remaining
assets to be privatized—including some of the largest assets yet, such as Czech Telecom, Transgas, Ceske Radiokomunicace, and the national energy producer, CEZ—and in the collection of
communist-era debts from Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and other developing countries. Another oft-employed strategy is the promotion of Czech exports abroad, which helps alleviate the immediate problem of unemployment, injects much needed liquidity into the economy, and generates additional tax revenue. The challenges of market reform are indeed daunting, but as the current government has shown, every challenge contains an opportunity. The current ministers have shown little compunction at exploiting every opportunity for personal gain.

“Neo-Svejkianism”
The Good Soldier Svejk still lives. Svejk, the archetypal Czech passive rebel created by Jaroslav Hasek in his early 1920s novel, The Good Soldier Svejk, remained outwardly obedient to his Austrian masters, but privately pursued his own interests, and usually undermined the authorities through insubordination disguised as ineptitude. By all appearances, the Czechs have been guided by Svejk in their recent relations within NATO and the EU. The Czech Republic maintains a formal affiliation with the West through its
The current ministers have shown little compunction at exploiting every opportunity for personal gain.24 SAIS Review Summer–F ALL 2002
membership in NATO and its inclusion in the list of EU candidates, yet it has wavered in its political will to shoulder the costs and responsibilities that such an association entails. The Czechs
joined NATO in spite of a relatively low level of public support for it, and in its first major test as an ally during the Kosovo war, the government moved quickly to dissociate itself from the campaign.
Support for EU membership has also started to wane in the face of seemingly continuous directives and criticism from Brussels regarding the implementation of the aquis communautaire. The
Czechs have grown increasingly resentful at what they regard as outside interference in their internal affairs. 8 According to recent
polls, only 46 percent of Czechs support EU membership, and only 20 percent consider Czech accession to the EU to be of long-run
importance to the country. 9
The Czech postcommunist malaise takes on a distinctively local flavor when it is overlaid with this growing ambivalence toward the West. The fact that Czech partnership with the West is
voluntary rather than coerced provides the government with leeway to pursue interests that diverge from, or even oppose, those of its Western partners.
The Czech “neo-Svejkian” posture toward NATO and the EU often means saying one thing and doing another.
The revival of Svejk in the postcommunist context produces a dan- gerous mixture of norms, practices, problems, and personalities remaining from the country’s communist past, juxtaposed with a newfound freedom that is detached from all sense of responsibility. Today, the Soldier Svejk is sowing the seeds of postcommunist corruption.
 
With Machine Guns and Ammo for All
PATRONAGE AND C ORRUPTION IN THE C ZECH R EPUBLIC
"Today, the Soldier Svejk is sowing the seeds of postcommunist corruption..."
"The Czechs, in particular, have developed a reputation for nontransparency and moral ambiguity in their official arms
trade.
 SAIS Review Summer–F ALL 2002
PATRONAGE AND C ORRUPTION IN THE C ZECH R EPUBLIC

The confluence of postcommunist malaise and diffidence toward the West is notoriously evident in the Czech Republic’s role in the international arms trade. The Czech economy has long maintained a significant military-industrial component, and communist Czechoslovakia was a principal supplier to the Soviet bloc and other anti-Western regimes during the Cold War. 10 After the Cold War, the industry began to suffer as a result of global military spending cuts and the loss of these traditional markets, which led to growing unemployment. Attempts to transform the arms industry were unsuccessful and strongly resisted by the arms lobby, which still retained protectors in high places in the government.
More recently, the Czech government renewed its emphasis on arms production and trade in order to capitalize on a relatively advanced segment of its industry. The Foreign Ministry has supported this policy by tasking commercial and military representatives at Czech missions worldwide with the promotion of Czech weapons exports. 11
In addition, the Czech military maintains huge stockpiles of obsolete weapons, ammunition, and equipment, often under lax security. Sales of this equipment, both official and
illicit, have also created much controversy. 12
Transparency International characterizes the arms trade as “hard-wired for corruption” due to the inherent opacity that surrounds weapons transactions. 13 The Czechs, in particular, have
developed a reputation for nontransparency and moral ambiguity in their official arms trade. In contrast to EU countries, which publish annual reports on arms sales, the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade keeps its figures secret. 14
Recent clients of the Czech Ministry of Defense
have included Syria, Cambodia, Algeria, Angola, and Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the Czechs have been instrumental in arming government forces in a bloody civil war, even in the midst of peace negotiations between the two sides. 15 In 1999, the Czechs proceeded with the sale of tanks and airplanes to Yemen with full knowledge that Yemen previously re-exported tanks to Sudan.16 More recently, two days after the September 11 attacks, Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kavan negotiated the sale of Czech L-39 military aircraft to Yemen, a state high on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s watch-list of countries that tolerate international terrorism.
Finally, illicit arms trade has flourished with the support of outside Russian “business interests,” and with the seeming inability of the Czech secret services (BIS) to stem the outflow of surplus weapons. 17 In one famous case, a Russian-financed Czech firm, Agroplast, almost succeeded in selling six Mig-21’s to North Korea, in spite of close monitoring by the BIS. 18
The extent of the trade, the seeming ease with which it is conducted, the official opacity that surrounds it, and the inability of the secret service to curtail it suggest the possibility of official complicity and corruption in these transactions.
The Czech Republic seems to have resumed its old place as rogue arms supplier par excellence. According to the journalist Jaroslav Kmenta:
In a way, it is a tradition. The Czech Republic has very good relations from the past with these countries. The Czech Republic has a number of receivables from the communist era there. It is
still trying to have them repaid. Czech businessmen have really ‘special’ relations with local politicians and authorities. Because of its risky nature, any deal with such a country, both legal and
illegal, increases the value of the bid. The amount of money involved is able to shut the eyes of politicians, officials or businessmen in Prague over problems that might arise. 19
Such behavior flies directly in the face of Czech commitments to its NATO allies and future EU partners. Although it has not yet signed the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, the Czech Re- public has agreed to abide by it. The Code of Conduct is intended to prevent arms transfers to human rights abusers, areas of violent conflict, and countries that might export weapons to unauthorized third parties. To justify its actions, the Czech government insists that none of its authorized trades are technically illegal (i.e.,trade with embargoed countries). Instead, the government can comfortably claim plausible deniability, arguing that it cannot be held responsible for what happens to the goods after they are delivered. Foreign Ministry spokesman Ales Pospisil put forth this government position, with just a touch of sarcasm, following a controversial sale to Sri Lanka:
I don’t want to sound cynical, but for any country, the most important thing is that the trade is correct within international
law. Of course, it would be much nicer to trade with Western Europe or the United States – it would be crystal clear that no gun would be misused. But this is reality. 20
In response, the West has resorted to the use of “sticks” in order to make its position clear. In 1999, after its repeated warnings were ignored, Washington threatened sanctions to convince
the Czechs to ban the sale of air conditioning and ventilation systems to a nuclear plant under construction in Iran. 21
Since the Iran affair, the Czechs have sought to avoid a similar recurrence by resorting to old-style secret diplomacy. This is most apparent in the government’s dealings with Iraq. An official
visit to Baghdad by government and business leaders in early 2000 encompassed all the elements of the current Czech malaise. Iraq was one of communist Czechoslovakia’s principal trading partners and the Czechs still hold about $500 million in receivables from Iraq, but trade between the two has been substantially curtailed
as a result of the UN embargo. Also, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) broadcasts from Prague to Iraq have further damaged economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries and provoked legitimate concerns about the possibility of a terrorist strike on RFE’s headquarters in the center of Prague. The Czech government under Prime Minister Milos Zeman has clearly tried to dissociate itself from what it insists is a U.S. initiative.22
The delegation to Iraq ostensibly intended to discuss the possibility of renewing trade relations and resolving outstanding debts, and to present the Czech point of view concerning RFE/RL. 23 The Foreign Ministry characterized the visit as “routine diplomatic talks,” but if this had been the case, why was it kept under the utmost secrecy for the next ten months, including the names of those comprising the delegation?
The government finally divulged the list of participants under threat of a lawsuit by Senator Michal Zantovsky. The mission was organized by Miroslav Slouf, a former communist function-
ary who is Zeman’s chief advisor, and an increasingly suspicious element in the current government. It included Deputy Foreign Minister Hynek Kmonicek, three representatives of Vitkovice Iron Works, and, most peculiarly, Milan Jedlicka, a Czech-American with an alleged criminal past that includes a conviction in the United States for cocaine smuggling and fraud, as well as an investigation for the murder of a U.S. drug enforcement agent. 24
It is still unknown exactly what transpired in these “diplomatic talks” and what Slouf might have promised to his hosts. Members of the delegation give conflicting accounts, and some still deny their par- ticipation, including Jedlicka. Allegedly, Jedlicka was brought in as a representative of Magna Oil, a U.S. firm that purchases Iraqi oil in the UN Oil for Food Program. The Czechs planned to employ his expertise in funneling Iraqi oil onto the world market in anticipation of accepting Iraqi crude as payment for Czech goods.
The delegation reports that it had no success in obtaining Iraqi orders.
Given its established tendencies in the arms trade, as well as the presence of Slouf and Jedlicka in the Baghdad delegation, the  reestablishment of Czech commercial connections with Iraq
through secret diplomatic missions is a worrisome development.
The Iraqi secret service is very active in Prague and the Czech BIS has proven singularly inept in restricting its operations. Iraq has made no secret of its desire to acquire the “miraculous” Czech Tamara radar, which is thought to be able to track even the U.S. stealth fighter-bomber. Since the bankrupt firm that produces the Tamara was privatized in 1993, it has not sold a single radar, but strangely four of the six it reportedly had in inventory went missing in late 1999. These radars are thought to have disappeared while the firm’s most recent owner was in prison for tax evasion, fraud, and embezzlement, though the BIS insists that it would know if there had been a theft. In the meantime, the company was recently sold again, while the Czech government was engaged in a losing battle to reclaim control of the copyrighted Tamara technology. 25
Given these circumstances, one can easily wonder if Iraq may soon have a much upgraded radar system to track Allied planes in its airspace.
Regardless of the actual outcome of this mission, the Czech government’s self-interested attempt at appeasement of a brutal dictatorship, particularly with regard to RFE/RL, from which the
Czechs directly benefited while under their own totalitarian regime, finds an ironic historical parallel with another infamous round of “diplomatic talks.” Could Baghdad have been Munich in reverse?

Power Politics: Cooperative Opposition

A corrupt network exists within the Czech political class, one that has exploited the vulnerabilities of the Czech system for its own
profit while consolidating its hold on power. However, this network is not exclusively centered around money. It is further strengthened by “mutual knowledge of guilt and the chance to use
this for [mutual] blackmail.”26 The network has two main components. The first is the power bloc formed by the so-called “Opposition Agreement” between the Social Democrats (CSSD) and
the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The second is the powerful communist-crony network that has emerged within the CSSD, with possible ties to the Russian mafia and intelligence services
The Opposition Agreement was hatched after the mid-1998 election when the CSSD failed to attain the majority needed to form a government. Rather than entering a coalition with the four
other center-right opposition parties, CSSD chairman Milos   part of both parties. The CSSD saw the chance to firmly establish itself as the moral authority in the anticorruption fight, while the ODS was able to cast itself as the repentant sinner seeking absolution. In reality, the two parties were engaged in constant disputes
over the running of the campaign: Basta was charged with incom- petence, and later with using investigations for political or personal purposes; the ODS was charged with obstructionism as party members now had influence over investigations concerning alleged misdeeds of fellow-ODS members. 28
Last summer, one year before the upcoming election, the program was resurrected after three years of dormancy. Where the government had previously conceded defeat, Prime Minister Zeman now claimed victory, saying that Clean Hands had resulted in the investigation of 4,300 people for serious economic crimes.
Czech voters remained more skeptical as few of the robber barons of privatization were actually convicted. 29 In fact, a mid-2000 survey showed that 84 percent of Czechs believed that bribes and connections were responsible for not-guilty verdicts in trials of those accused of economic crime. Seventy-six percent attributed such
verdicts to political pressure. 30 Last August, the Clean Hands campaign was transferred from the political level to the institutional level. State attorneys now oversee the campaign in cooperation with police units investigating serious economic and financial crime. 31

Corrupting Economic Policy
 Viewed in the most favorable light, the transaction can only be characterized as governmentnegligence of its fiduciary responsibility to Czech taxpayers

There has been an increasing tendency on the part of the CSSD-ODS bloc to base important economic policy decisions on political criteria. Yet these political considerations do not necessarily follow party ideology; rather, they reflect personal and political opportunism and a desire for raw power. Significant opportuni-
ties to exploit political and economic power still exist, including decisions regarding the fate of several state-owned companies, the
restructuring of bankrupt firms, the sale of a colossal amount of nonperforming loans, the collection of communist-era debts, and the allocation of major public contracts. Opportunities for entre- preneurial politicians are boundless.
A tremendous amount of economic power has recently been consolidated around one agency. By virtue of the recent creation of the Ceska Konsolidacni Agentura (CKA), a “garbage can” for com- mercial loans gone bad, economic policy is now more than ever susceptible to political manipulation by vested interests. The CKA unified the existing state agencies involved in bad debt collection.
Rather than placing legal and economic experts on CKA’s board, the government staffed it with political appointees: three members of parliament from the CSSD and four from the ODS.32 Their economic power lies not only in the mechanism by which CKA’s losses are to be covered by privatization income and other state sources,
but also in the wealth of information they can easily obtain concerning pending bankruptcies and privatizations. Furthermore, the agency represents a wellspring of potential political favors—in the form of party sponsorship or direct payments to individuals—since many prospective buyers of the debt are the same tunnelers and asset-strippers who originated them, and who have the greatest information on the real value of the collateral. 33 In order to provide “smokescreen” cover to the real issue of political control over this vitally powerful agency, the politicians on the board were initially granted exorbitant salaries for their services. In the public
relations firestorm that followed this announcement, the salaries were rescinded, creating the impression for the uninformed public that the problem was solved. 34 However, the costs to Czech taxpayers could be enormous. Political control over industrial restructuring has already driven the costs of Czech restructuring to 40
percent of GDP, making the Czech privatization process the most expensive in the world. No end appears in sight. The CKA currently administers a 270 billion-crown portfolio of bad assets that will soon swell to 450 billion. Through the CKA, about 23 percent of Czech GDP will be subject to the political whim of seven politi- cians. 35
Toward the end of 2001, with only about six months left until the mid-June elections, the government declared its intention to complete several of the largest privatizations to date. These included the national energy producer, CEZ, the chemical holding company Unipetrol, Transgas, Czech Telecom, Ceske
Radiokomunikace, and even a portion of Prague’s Ruzyne Airport.
Questions were immediately raised as to why the government was in such a hurry, particularly since the most recent series of com- parably sized transactions had taken three-and-a-half years to com- plete. According to Machacek, the motives for this latest initiative lie instead in the exercise of power:
The ministers want to enjoy the power of this decision-making so some future government will not be able to. No one is 100
percent sure at the moment that any form of the current CSSD/32 SAIS Review Summer–F ALL 2002
ODS power bloc will survive the elections, so the thinking is, let’s not leave the fruits of power for anyone who might succeed us.
Machacek’s predictions seem to have been confirmed by more recent developments. In keeping with its emerging practice, the government directly appointed advisors for the sale of the three utilities rather than submitting the selection process to competitive bids. 36 In a similar fashion, the government chose the winner
in the Radiokomunikace privatization rather than submitting it to a competitive bid. 37
Viewed in the most favorable light, the transaction can only be mcharacterized as government negligence of its fiduciary responsibility to Czech taxpayers.
 
The sale also has the key ingredients of a crony-privatization: lack of competition, lack of transparency, and a drastically undervalued purchase price.
Initially, it seemed that the government had also found its favored buyer for CEZ, although competitive bidding was supposedly still in process. The special care the government gave to the French state energy firm, Electricité de France (EdF), raised many eyebrows. Several meetings between the two parties, including a visit to Paris by five members of parliament from the CSSD and the ODS, followed by a trip by Minister of Industry and Trade Gregr, raised concerns over favoritism among the other competing bidders. Both of these visits coincided with major modifica- tions to the privatization terms that took other bidders by surprise.
In January of this year, the government decided to abandon a public tender offer for the CEZ privatization in favor of a direct sale.
 
Viewed in the most favorable light, the transaction can only be characterized as government negligence of its fiduciary responsibility to Czech taxpayers.

Despite disqualification in two previous rounds of the tender process, EdF was still in the running. Informed observers speculated that the government’s public courting of other interested buyers, like German energy giant RWE, was merely a ploy to encourage EdF to raise its price and meet the government’s terms for the sale. 38
Interestingly, EdF’s advisor was the Vienna-based European Privatization and Investment Corporation (EPIC), which is headed by Vladimir Motlik. EPIC is also the publisher of the Czech tabloid Super, which is known to be friendly toward ODS, possibly because Motlik is a long-time friend and tennis partner of Vaclav Klaus. 39 In the end, however, all contestants for CEZ, including EdF, eventually withdrew their bids as a result of the government’s constant changes to the conditions of the sale. Without a buyer for the utility, the government recently undertook an equally controversial domestic restructuring of the industry. 40

Cultivating Friendly Media

This Motlik-Klaus connection is only one component of the ruling bloc’s patronage of “friendly” media sources. Conversely, the government has used all instruments available to suppress and intimidate media that takes a more critical stance. Vladimir Zelezny’s TV Nova has been very gracious in its reporting on the ODS-CSSD Opposition Agreement, always dutifully presenting the ODS as a true opposition party and never exposing the truth behind this cynical modus vivendi. 41 In return, the government has treated Nova with the utmost benevolence. It recently extended Nova’s license for another twelve years for free, although Czech taxpayers may have to foot the bill for a possible $23 billion judgement against the country as a result of Zelezny’s misdealings with U.S. businessman Ronald Lauder. 42
The Klaus-Motlik-Zelezny circle would have had cause to celebrate had the CEZ privatization been completed as originally envisaged. The tabloid Super, which lauds the ODS and trashes its political opponents, including anyone close to President Havel, is owned by EPIC. 43 EPIC would have realized an enormous profit by advising EdF in the CEZ tender. Super and Nova, already close through other connections, agreed to merge their advertising businesses last year. Motlik and Zelezny have both been generous in their sponsorship of the ODS, and Nova has been particularly vocal in its endorsement of Klaus as the next president. 44 Although
the CEZ—EdF transaction failed in the end, the conflicts of interest along the way were clear and present, and the episode is justone of the many that supports President Havel’s characterization of the Czech political-economy as “mafia-capitalism.”

The government has used all instruments available to suppress and intimidate media that takes a more critical stance.
Klaus has proven equally efficient in disposing of his enemies on the airwaves. In June of last year, the director of Czech TV’s (CT) political programming department, Martin Mrnka, was dismissed by interim CT director, Jiri Balvin, over some trivial management mistakes. However, his dismissal closely followed the airing of a program entitled “Tentacles of Corruption,” which Klaus described as “tendentious, expedient and tantamount to an attack against
the democratic system in the Czech Republic.” The head of CT’s public relations explained the timing of Mrnka’s dismissal as an “unfortunate coincidence.”45 Several months later, Balvin was elected to be general director of CT for the next six years. One member of the council that elected him suggested that political
pressure played an important role in his appointment. 46

The Mysterious Mr. Slouf

Another central component of this corrupt network within the government involves the ascendancy of old-guard communists to positions of influence in the CSSD. Allegations of communist complicity have surrounded several ministers for some time. Foreign Minister Jan Kavan’s purported cooperation with the secret
police (StB) while he was living in Britain in the 1970s was widely publicized. 47 Several formerly high-ranking communists have recently been appointed to cabinet posts in the government by Interior Minister Stanislav Gross and by Minister without Portfolio Karel Brezina. Gross and Brezina, (then) at ages 30 and 27, respectively, are the two youngest members of the government. Opposition party members speculate that the CSSD is compensating for their
lack of experience by having them appoint older “Bolshevik” advisors.48
The encouragement behind such appointments likely comes from the mysterious but powerful influence of Miroslav Slouf.

Miroslav Slouf, Prime Minister Zeman’s chief advisor, is a former high-ranking communist apparatchik. He joined CSSD in the early 1990s, and has since had a growing, if insidious, influ- ence in the party. Well connected to his old Soviet-era network and well practiced in its ways, he is a serious political force in the current government. Stories of his business dealings, contacts, and capabilities have attained mythical proportion. He is allegedly both willing and able to buy support with favors, and many are thought to be obligated to him for past services performed. Those who domnot feel duly grateful are allegedly held at bay by compromising
information he holds and the influence he wields. His involvement in the Iraq trip and his connection with Milan Jedlicka are certain,
but there are still more questions than answers as to what they exactly mean. In any case, Slouf’s Baghdad trip and the Slouf-Jedlicka connection, especially with regard to Jedlicka’s involvement in planning Zeman’s proposed 2000 trip to the United States, have attracted attention at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Many believe that the Czech government’s ties to Slouf and Jedlicka prompted the United States to cancel Zeman’s visit,m though official sources neither confirm or deny it. 49
Slouf’s role in several conspiracies aimed at discrediting Zeman’s political opponents is fairly well established, though he and Zeman deny any involvement in or knowledge of such affairs, and lower level aides have generally taken the blame. In the “Olovo Affair,” detailed plans to attack the reputation of Petra Buzkova,
a high-ranking CSSD member and vocal opponent of Zeman, were leaked to journalists at the Czech daily Mlada fronta Dnes. All evidence pointed to Slouf’s involvement, but two lower level aides, Vratislav Sima and Zdenek Sarapatka, took the fall. 50 In the “Stirin Affair,” the director of Stirin Castle came under pressure to corroborate a story, allegedly concocted by Zeman and Kavan, accusing former Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec of bribing journalists at the castle. In spite of Slouf’s apparent involvement, he somehow avoided the official blame while Foreign Ministry official Karel Srba, who also played an instrumental role, got sacked. 51
Efforts to intimidate and discredit political opponents make a good scandal and are certainly worthy of rebuke, but by now the Czechs have grown accustomed to intrigue and can recognize it when they see it. Much more alarming is Slouf’s alleged drive to capture control of the police force. On 13 March 2000, President Havel tasked the BIS with investigating apparent attempts by “one concrete person” to destabilize two elite units of the police squad, the Office for Uncovering Organized Crime (UOOZ) and the Sec- tion for Uncovering Corruption (SPOK). Havel’s suspicion arose from a series of anonymous letters concerning the state of investigation of a number of serious crimes. The investigations had started to falter as early as 1996, but since the CSSD came to power, the inability of the police to successfully prosecute cases “assumed almost incredible dimensions.”52
 
Indeed, over the previous five years, damages to the Czech economy from “tunneling” (the pillaging of corporate assets from within by owners and managers, leaving behind only a hollow shell for unsuspecting shareholders) and tax evasion had exceeded 250 billion crowns; yet not a single important case was successfully closed. It appeared that certain crimes were receiving protective cover from high places, particularly the investigations of mysterious Swiss accounts held by the ODS, major cases of asset stripping, and political scandals such as the Stirin affair.
 
As it has become more entrenched and powerful, this Russian# m a f i a - i n t e l l i g e n c e network has exerted a corrupting influence
on Czech institutions.
 
" Not long afterward, Zdenek Machacek, the head of the UOOZ unit that specializes in investigating the Russian mafia, was arrested and detained on trumped up charges of blackmail. It is this latter case that is most informative here since the attorney representing the star witness against Machacek is a man named Josef Doucha.
Josef Doucha, a former police investigator, was Sloufs top choice for president of the police force. In 1996, as a UOOZ investigator, Doucha was criticized for cultivating contacts that exceeded the framework of police work with the Russian and Ukrainian mafias..."
 
Havels curiosity was also piqued by the opposing verdicts of Zeman and Interior Minister Vaclav Grulich on the work of the heads of these units. While Grulich evaluated their work positively, Zeman termed it far from brilliant. Zemans assessment may provide some insight into an effort by those close to him to remove
and replace the leadership of the police force. Grulich privately confided to Havel that Slouf was indeed trying to influence personnel decisions at the highest levels in the force. Grulich also made a public statement to this effect shortly before he was invol- untarily dismissed from office by Zeman and replaced by Stanislav Gross.
The heads of the two departments had already come under other forms of direct pressure. SPOK head Evzen Sirek had been accused of accessing top secret computer files from his home personal computer, but was later cleared of guilt. However, the mere fact that a criminal investigation had occurred would be enough
to ensure that Sirek never passed security screening, thus severely limiting his career. 53
Not long afterward, Zdenek Machacek, the head of the UOOZ unit that specializes in investigating the Russian mafia, was arrested and detained on trumped up charges of blackmail. 54
It is this latter case that is most informative here since the attorney representing the star witness against Machacek is a man named Josef Doucha.
 
Josef Doucha, a former police investigator, was Sloufs top choice for president of the police force. In 1996, as a UOOZ investigator, Doucha was criticized for cultivating contacts that exceeded the framework of police work with the Russian and Ukrainian mafias.
 
It was because of these contacts that Doucha was denied the top post at UOOZ. 55 Doucha currently works as an attorney, and in addition to representing the star witness in the blackmail case against former anti-Russian mafia unit police chief Machacek, he represents a group of Russian entrepreneurs with apparent links to the Russian mafia. In fact, Douchas and Machaceks paths had crossed previously. In 1995, Machacek was the lead investigator in the largest mafia round-up to date. About two hundred people were arrested in a raid on U Holubu restaurant in Prague, where mafia bosses were said to be dividing spheres of influence. Doucha currently represents some of those detained in the operation. 56 Naturally, Havel became concerned when he
learned that Slouf was pressing hard to have Doucha named as police president.
Havels announcement of the investigation sparked immediate criticism both by CSSD and ODS members. The two parties immediately proposed changes to the Czech constitution that would remove the presidents powers over the BIS.57 Shortly after the investigation began, Zeman removed Minister Without Port- folio Jaroslav Basta from office. Basta had been in charge of the governments Clean Hands campaign, and its lack of success was cited as the cause for his dismissal. Basta had also been in charge of the Czech intelligence services, including the BIS. After his removal, authority over the BIS was assigned to Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla, Zemans heir apparent and close ally, but a man with no experience in intelligence. 58
A couple months later, newly appointed Deputy Police President Vaclav Jakubik announced the results of the investigation: there were no serious shortcomings and both elite police units were working effectively.59
This outcome, which at the time was hailed as a victory and a vindication for President Havel, must be examined more closely. Immediately after the investigation began, control over the BIS was shifted to Zemans protégé, Spidla. Notwithstanding this, the BIS has proven itself inept time and again.
Most importantly, it was later revealed that Vaclav Jakubik, the official who announced the conclusion of the investigation, is connected, through a chain of business partners and companies, to one of the most powerful and dangerous bosses of the Russian mafia, Sergei Mikhailov. 60
The UOOZ has been on Mikhailovs trail for quite some time, but he appears to have a very influential friend in Mr. Jakubik, who now oversees the antimafia unit. 61 However, because of Jakubiks dubious business contacts as well as previous professional infractions, his security vetting by the National Security Office (NBU) was held in limbo for almost two years after his appointment, meaning that he could not access classified information. He was only able to remain in his position because of a series of special dispensations granted by Interior Minister Gross. Recently, however, Jakubik was granted security clearance by NBU director, Tomas Kadlec, even though the NBU employee responsible for investigating his application refused Jakubik clearance. In the controversy that followed this revelation of political influence in the security clearance process, the only person to be sacked was Jitka has his tacit approval. Either way, whether by direct order or carte blanche, Zeman is implicated in Sloufs power-play.

From Russia with Love
As it has become more entrenched and powerful, this Russian# m a f i a - i n t e l l i g e n c e network has exerted a corrupting influence on Czech institutions
 
Several recent BIS reports have documented efforts by both the Russian mafia and Russian intelligence to gain influence over sections of the Czech government and
economy. According to Janes Intelligence Review, the Russian mafia has strong links with the Russian intelligence apparatus.65 As it has become more entrenched and powerful, this Russian mafia-intelligence network has exerted a corrupting influence on Czech institutions. As discussed in the previous section, this external
network may have already gained a foothold in the Czech police, and possibly even in sections of the Czech government under Prime Minister Zeman.
One only needs to take a ten-minute walk through idyllic downtown Karlovy Vary to gain a sense of the continuing Russian
presence in the Czech Republic. The town is marked by street signs printed in Russian, and the streets are filled with Russian nouveaux riches. There is even a newly constructed Russian Orthodox church.
Certain hotels and spas cater exclusively to Russian customers. But Karlovy Varys foreign clientele are not there just for the healing
waters. According to a 1997 BIS report, the Russian intelligence services are firmly entrenched there, and have purchased a significant amount of real estate in town. There has also been a steady wave of immigration from Russia to Karlovy Vary. The editor of the local Russian language newspaper estimates about fifteen thou-
sand full-time Russian residents while, interestingly, the mayor of Karlovy Vary estimates only one to two hundred. The majority of these immigrants allegedly got rich during the Russian privatization process, and they still maintain business connections with Russias industrial heartland, oil fields, and arms factories.
The old Soviet crony network remains strong in Karlovy Vary, and it enjoys the convenience of a daily nonstop flight between Karlovy
Vary and Moscow. 66
In its 2000 annual report, the BIS cites the ongoing attempt by the Russian secret services to gain influence in the Czech gov-ernment. Their interest has grown because of events like the opening of the Temelin nuclear power plant and Czech accession to NATO. Russian intelligence has attempted to infiltrate various Czech ministries in order to influence decision making and to discredit the Czech Republic abroad. It has also focused on raising questions within the Czech Republic concerning the costs and appropriateness of NATO membership. 67
The same 2000 BIS report, as well as statements from the Ministry of Interior, cite a parallel rise in mafia activity along with a shift in tactics by the mafia. Already firmly entrenched in the Czech Republic, the mafia is now branching into legal businesses such as financial and real estate investments, trade in raw materi-
als, and manufacturing. Using the capital generated in other countries from criminal enterprises, the mafia is setting up such legitimate businesses in the Czech Republic. It is also seeking to gain influence over the economic spheres in which it operates, and over the government that regulates them. According to the Ministry of
Interior:
 

"The response of most Czechs to continued corruption has been a retreat into passivity and continued acceptance of corruption as a norm.."

"One economic sphere that mafia elements appear to have penetrated is the $3.6 billion in debt owed by the Russian government to the Czech government. Approximately $2.5 billion of this amount was retired in January of this year in a highly irregular transaction involving a very suspicious intermediary called Falkon Capital. Observers, including an array of journalists covering the deal in the two countries, as well as the French and Swiss secret services, suspect that the transaction may have been part of an melaborate money laundering scheme. The transaction itself was highly complex and shrouded in secrecy on all sides. The net result was that the Czech government received about twenty billion crowns (roughly $540 million) from Falkon and cancelled $2.5 billion of the debt owed by Russia. Although this represents a seem- ingly paltry 20 percent collection rate on the debt, it nonetheless represents 3 percent of the government’s election year budget...."

 
 They attempt to penetrate economic spheres, gain interest in strategic economic sectors, and they try to cause corruption of state administration and influence decision making. They try to
establish their members or collaborators in bodies of state power and political parties. 68
One economic sphere that mafia elements appear to have penetrated is the $3.6 billion in debt owed by the Russian government to the Czech government. Approximately $2.5 billion of this
amount was retired in January of this year in a highly irregular transaction involving a very suspicious intermediary called Falkon Capital. Observers, including an array of journalists covering the deal in the two countries, as well as the French and Swiss secret services, suspect that the transaction may have been part of an melaborate money laundering scheme. The transaction itself was highly complex and shrouded in secrecy on all sides. The net result was that the Czech government received about twenty billion crowns (roughly $540 million) from Falkon and cancelled $2.5 billion of the debt owed by Russia. Although this represents a seem- ingly paltry 20 percent collection rate on the debt, it nonetheless represents 3 percent of the governments election year budget.
Since the agreements among the Czechs, the Russians, and Falkon have remained classified, experts and journalists must deduce the details of the transaction based on leaked information and inter views with Russian and Czech officials. However, there are still many questions as to what actually transpired.
It is not known where Falkon, a tiny firm that was recently recapitalized last November with about $70,000, obtained the $540 million with which it purchased the debt from the Czech govern-
ment. But what is known is equally strangethat this small, un- known firm received approximately $700 million dollars from the Russian government in what observers say was record time. The money that Falkon received in exchange for its rights to the Russian debt took a circuitous route, the actual point of origin remaining unknown. All that is known is that the funds flowed through the Russian state-owned electricity monopoly, United Energy Systems (UES), including about sixty-five of its subsidiaries, and then through the French branch of a Moscow bank called AKB Eurofinance, to Deutsche Bank, and then to Falkon. The funds that flowed from UES to Falkon seem to be from one of two possible sources: the Russian government transferred $1.35 billion UES, and UES also borrowed $700 million from Russian Sberbank.
Of this $2 billion flow to UES, $700 million found its way to Falkon through the path just described. In addition, UES will compensate Falkon over the next several years with an additional $30 million in electricity on very favorable terms, which Falkon then plans to export.
There are many problems with this. Obviously, a tremendous amount of money appears to be missing. While a portion of the funds that originally went to UES were used to settle UES tax li-
abilities to the government, intercompany loans among its subsidiaries, and to make a loan to Gazprom, there is at least $635 million of the funds transferred from the Russian government to UES, supposedly as part of the debt transaction, that did not reach Falkon. On the Czech side, the only information to transpire is that Falkon received $700 million and that the government re-
ceived about $540 million, leaving $160 million available for unspecified ends.
There are also many unanswered questions about how Falkon became involved in these transactions. 69
After the transaction was complete, the government finally conceded that the Russian side had insisted on Falkons involvement, without which the Czechs would not receive any payment, and cited that the Russians were also binding all parties to secrecy about the transaction. Prior to the sale of the debt, the BIS investigated Falkon as part of the normal security clearance for such a transaction. The BIS actually had prior knowledge of Falkon as the firm had tried to contract with  the government for the collection of some debts from Libya in 1997, but thenFinance Minister Ivan Pilip had rejected Falkons offer due to BIS concerns about the alleged Russian mafia connections of two of Falkons Georgian principals, Paata Mamaladze and his partner, Vaza Kiknavelidze. In addition, one of the other founders, who is no longer known to be active in the firm, had been a member of the GRU, Russias military intelligence service. 70
The BIS again cited risks in the current transaction due to Mamaladzes continued indirect ownership of the firm, even though he had formally stepped down from his board position. It was Mamaladze who negotiated the current transaction on behalf of Falkon. The BIS was also concerned about Falkons uncertain financial wherewithal. According to BIS chief Frantisek Bublan: We screened them and informed the government that the company is not exactly solvent and that their intention might be to launder money.71
In the end, this security vetting process proved to be irrelevant as the deal structure changed at the very last minute. The BIS had not been informed about the involvement of, and thus had
not investigated, the apparent financing agent for the transactionAKB Eurofinance.
By the time the transaction was executed, the Czech government was well aware of the risks involved, but it did not consider the risks sufficient to justify calling off the deal. Apparently the
Russian contention that they know Falkon well was enough. Perhaps the amount of money involved for the state budget, for party coffers, or possibly for personal use was enough to justify this lapse in judgment. The Russian newspaper Vedomosti quoted a U.S. representative of UES, David Hurn, as saying Falkon supposedly financed several programs of the Czech government from this money.72
The response of government ministers when questioned about the deal is generally to claim ignorance, to refuse to talk about it, or to pass responsibility on to someone else. Deputy Fi-
nance Minister Ladislav Zelinka, the chief negotiator of the deal for the Czech side, is a bit more Machiavellian:

You know, I am not interested in Russian rackets and schemes.

That is their business. For me, it is essential that here we have twenty billion and that the department of financial analyses which reports to me states this money is not dirty. 73
When challenged by opposition parties in parliament to give an explanation of the transaction, Prime Minister Zeman offers this classic bit of obfuscation:
Let some of us stop behaving like a resentful and indolent blockhead, who, after he himself is unsuccessful, criticizes the working results of others. I wish people would stop acting like
those who announce to the world that they are going to save itand then do not even manage to save themselves. To put it briefly, I would hope that no one behaves in the manner ofin truth
the [opposition] Quad Coalition. 74
Zeman thus registers the Falkon transaction as a diplomatic coup, even though it has further muddied the name of his country abroad. Prague essentially helped to defraud the Paris club, to
which Russia is obligated to repay $130 billion before obligations to other creditors. However, these international agreements stipulate that payments are to be made on a government-to-government level. By engaging Falkon, the Czechs were able to break in line ahead of their Western allies. And Zemans coup was not a good deal by comparable standardswhile the Czechs recovered 20 per-cent of the cancelled debt, the Slovaks recovered over one-third of their debt this year, and the Germans, French, and Italians do not give discounts on Russian debt at all.
Of course, in addition to skirting international agreements and double-crossing allies, the Falkon transaction may have a more sinister side. Respekt journalist Jaroslav Spurny clearly outlines the criminal possibilities in which the Czech government may now be complicit:
Falkon simply enabled the Russians to release money from their budget as if it was earmarked for the amortization of debts, while keeping it somewhere for uncontrollable usage, corruption,
propaganda, and other necessities in the struggle for power. In return, the company was given the attractive opportunity to launder tens of billions of crowns that it may account for as
received installments from Russia, no matter what kind of money it actually is. 75
 
Washington has become apprehensive about the Czechs as a security risk within NATO.

The Falkon transaction, which Zeman heralded as a huge success for the Czech Republic, is only the latest in a series of con-
spiracy theories that have hounded the Zeman government.
It has not been proven that money laundering occurred, though there is also not enough evidence to rule it out, and the governments involved do not seem to be interested in proving the conspiracy theorists wrong. Still less is known about the possible involvement of people like Slouf, Doucha, and Jakubik in this scheme. Time will hopefully tell. At present, how-
ever, interested observers, such as the United States, consider the presence of such individuals at high posts in the government bureaucracy, with their potentially dangerous contacts with Russian mafia and intelligence organizations, to be just cause for concern.
According to Karel Kovanda, the Czech ambassador to NATO, Washington has become apprehensive about the Czechs as a security risk within NATO. He adds that it is possible that the U.S.
Senate will not ratify Czech accession to the ATOMAL treaty, which provides NATO members with classified information about U.S. and British nuclear weapons, for fear that some of these secrets may fall into the wrong hands. 76

Looking Ahead
Tva vlada, lide, se k tobe navratila. People, your government has returned to you. Vaclav Havel borrowed Tomas Masaryks words, delivered in 1918 upon the founding of the first Czechoslovak Republic, for his 1990 New Years Day speech. In 1990, as in 1918, the statement was an honest pledge to the Czechoslovak people as well as a call to the responsibility that their new freedom would entail. However, the response of  most Czechs to continued corruption has been a retreat into passivity and continued acceptance of corruption as a norm
.
Following the release of the Transparency International index, a poll revealed that 52 percent of Czechs consider their nation to be corrupt. Over 40 percent also said that corruption has always existed, exists now, and will always exist, and that it is thus useless to try to fight it. Moreover, only 4 percent said they were ready to report corruption. 77
The ruling power bloc has done its utmost to take the gov- ernment back from the people. In its Nations In Transit report, Freedom House cites a steady decline in democratization, press independence, and rule of law, and an increase in corruption in recent years. Yet the Czech people have remained startlingly acquiescent
The response of most Czechs to continued corruption has been a retreat into passivity and continued acceptance of corruption as a norm to such negative developments. It is possible that disgust has led to apathy. It is also possible that they are not fully aware of the costs that they must individually bear as a result of widespread corruption. 78
It is admittedly easier for individual citizens to work within the corrupt system as it exists than to stand against it. Citi-
zen-based initiatives have been too few and far between, and the current government has been suspicious of nongovernmental organizations. The Czechs are still coming to terms with the burden of responsibility that accompanies their new freedom, and the cost that each member of society must bear to defend it. Until Czech society at large is willing to bear this burden, conditions will remain ripe for continued corruption. 79
In addition to pressure from below, institutional reform must accompany any serious battle against corruption. The public bureaucracy, the court system, and, as discussed earlier, local
law enforcement continue to be subject to political pressure. Corrupt or corruptible individuals must be removed from service, and the institutions themselves detached from the possibility of political influence.
 
In the political sphere, this year’s mid-June elections must not result in another government founded on an Opposition Agreement. Special interests, both within and behind the CSSD
and ODS, are already working to preserve the current bloc. Hopes previously rested on the ability of the Quad Coalition parties to garner the support needed to gain a spot in the government. 80
However, following a financial scandal involving one of the coalition members, the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), the coalition disbanded. Two of the former Quad Coalition parties, the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-CSL) and the Freedom Union (US- DEU), have decided to remain in coalition with one another.
Candidatures that would have gone to the ODA will now be offered to independent candidates. 81
Yet it is unlikely that this coalition can muster enough combined electoral support to form a government excluding either the CSSD or ODS. In any event, a governing coalition comprised of the KDU-CSL, the US-DEU, and either the CSSD or the ODS would still be vastly preferable to a renewal of the CSSD-ODS Opposition Agreement. However, the KDU-CSL and the US-DEU are currently divided over their preferred coalition partners. Such differences must be overcome in morder to break the hold of the CSSD-ODS power bloc, and to restore true balance to the Czech government, which is in dire need of the chastening tension of credible political opposition.
Finally, the Czechs need continual outside “encouragement” to clean up their act. Organs like NATO and the EU are well positioned to pressure the government into adopting and abiding by the standards and values embraced by the West. This influence is all the more imperative given the efforts of external criminal networks to further corrupt the system. The EU is particularly important since most Czechs recognize, whether they will admit it or not, that their future lies with full integration into Europe. It should be made clear that to become part of Europe, and to fully participate in its institutions, the Czechs must not only adopt a body of laws, regulations, and standards, but they must put them into practice. In the most recent EU annual report on the Czech Republic, overt criticism of the state of Czech corruption was conspicuously absent. This was to be the last report before accession decisions were made, so it was politically imperative to cast the Czech Republic in a positive light. 83 At the same time, however, Brussels must know that admitting a still dysfunctional Czech Republic into the European club is not good for anybody.

If both sides are serious about enlargement, the challenge posed by endemic corruption must be faced head-on
 
Notes
PATRONAGE AND C ORRUPTION IN THE C ZECH R EPUBLIC

1 Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 1997,” <www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/rank-97.htm> (2 May, 2002).
 
2 Transparency International, “New index highlights worldwide corruptionm crisis,” press release, 27 June 2001 <http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001/ cpi2001.html> (14 June 2002).
 
3 Adrian Karanycky, Alexander Motyl, and Amanda Schnetzer, eds., Nations In Transit 2001 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers for Freedom House, 2001),166.
 
4 Quoted in Karanycky et al., Nations In Transit 2001, 165.
 
5 Karanycky et al., Nations In Transit 2001, 165.
 
 
6 Czech privatization generated minimal income for the government as assets were either given away or sold for bargain prices. Direct foreign investment was effectively blocked by the various privatization schemes employed, and by the
political imperative to avoid selling “the family silver.” Finally, the majority of Organs like NATO and the EU are well positioned to pressure the government into adopting and abiding by the standards and values embraced by the West.
Czech industry was never restructured; in addition, it remained unaccountable to shareholders, uncompetitive, and directly dependent upon state subsidies or heavily indebted to state-owned banks. Jan Machacek, “‘After battle, everyones a general, but privatization needed one, Prague Business Journal, 28 September 2001.

7 Fiscal budget deficits tripled between 1997 and 2000, to 46.1 billion crowns (3.7 percent of GDP). Unemployment increased to 9.3 percent in 1999 from 3.6 percent in 1996 due to flagging or bankrupt enterprises. While these trends are not exclusively the result of the privatization methods chosen by the government, the direct costs of bankruptcies and ongoing subsidies, as well as the arrested development of competitive industry, have certainly contributed to the current economic woes. Czech Republic, EIU Country Profile 2001, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 30, 50-51.
 
8 Matthew Rhodes, Czech Malaise and Europe, Problems of Post Communism 47, no. 2 (March/April 2000): 58-59.
 
9 European Commission, Applicant Countries Eurobarometer 2001: Public Opinion in the Countries Applying for European Union Membership, March 2002 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion> (2 May 2002). See also, Prague Business Journal, 16 July 2001.
 
10 Following a tradition that dated back to the days of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, Czechoslovakia was one of the largest arms producers in the world. By the late 1980s, the industry employed well over ninety thousand people and accounted for about half of the countrys foreign trade. During the Cold War, Czechoslovakia was a principal supplier of arms to areas of Cold War conflict, including Iraq, Ethiopia, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Algeria, India, and Vietnam. The Czechs were also a favored supplier to numerous terrorist organizations and they developed a bad reputation worldwide for indiscriminate sales of explosives
and machine guns to such networks. The Czech plastic explosive, Semtex, was employed in the Lockerbie bombing in 1988. Czech Arms Deals Burgeoning Even After Transition, Respekt, 18 June 2001.
 
11 Pavla Novakova, Soldiers and Diplomats Will Promote Czech Weapons Abroad, Lidove noviny (Prague), 4 October 2000.
#
12 Czech Arms Deals Burgeoning Even After Transition, Respekt, 18 June 2001.
 
13 Joe Roeber, The arms bazaar: hard-wired for corruption, TI Newsletter, June
2001 <http://www.transparency.org/newsletters/2001.2/third.html> (14 June 2002).
 
14 James Pitkin, Weapons of Choice, Prague Post, 23 May 2001.
 
15 Ibid.
 
16 Jaroslav Spurny, War Is a Racket, Respekt, 18 March 2002.
 
17 BIS is the civilian counterintelligence division of the secret service.
 
18 In 1999, the BIS acknowledged that one of the largest international arms smuggling groups had been operating in the Czech Republic for a number of years, and that, in spite of its close surveillance of the operation, numerous illicit transactions had been completed. A company called Agroplast, officially engaged in mineral mining and waste glass processing, had been supplying countries like Libya, Iran, and North Korea with weapons from former Eastern Bloc arms depots. In March of that year, several company representatives were detained in Azerbaijan in connection with the export of six MIG-21 aircraft from the Czech Republic to North Korea. According to the BIS, the smugglers 48SAIS ReviewSummerFALL2002 operated from Russia, and the company was financed by Russian banks. Two company executives had also been detained in Russia, but the benevolent intervention of Moscow mayor Luzhkov secured their release.BIS: Weapons Trading Group Operated in Czech Republic,Mlada fronta Dnes(Prague), 12 October 1999.
 
19 Jaroslav Kmenta, Czech Firms Still Trying Business With Risky Countries, Mlada fronta Dnes, 28 February 2000.
 
20 James Pitkin, Weapons of Choice, Prague Post, 23 May 2001.
 
21 Additional complexities surrounding the transaction suggest that there was more to it than meets the eye. The Czech firm, ZVVZ Milevsko, was contracted by a Russian general contractor, Atomstroyexport, for the project. The wife of current Chamber of Deputies Chairman Vaclav Klaus is a member of ZVVZs board of directors. Moreover, the transaction had been approved by the Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade for a year before anyone took issue with it.
Prague Seeks to Ease US Concern at N-Tech for Iran, CTK Czech News Agency, 23 February 2000.

22 Minister of Industry and Trade, Miroslav Gregr, even proposed that the United States reimburse the Czechs for lost trade resulting from RFE/RL broadcasts to Iran and Iraq. Adela Knapova, Respekt, 1 February 2000.

23 The Czechs also have legitimate security concerns about the presence of RFE/RL in the center of Prague. In 1998, a BIS investigation uncovered a plan by Iraq to bomb the building, but the Iraqi agent in charge of the operation defected to Britain. The BIS only informed the United States after the fact. Jindrich Sidlo, Respekt, 15 February 2000.
 
24 Not all three of these representatives were actually employed by Vitkovice.
The Slouf-Jedlicka connection has aroused sufficient suspicion in the U.S. government to justify personal warnings by former U.S. Ambassador John Shattuck to both Prime Minister Zeman and Foreign Minister Kavan, and by Secretary of State Albright to President Havel. Jedlickas later involvement in organizing Zemans planned fall 2000 trip to the United States is thought to have been the reason for the trips cancellation by the U.S. government, though this is staunchly denied by Zeman. Pavla Novakova, The Secret Iraqi Mission Ended in Failure, Respekt, 16 November 2000.
 
25 The Defense Ministry frantically searched for the 1993 contract assuring the governments right to control the technology, but to no avail. See Thomas Horejsi, In Pardubice, Four Miraculous Tamara Radars are Unaccounted For, Respekt, 10 September 1999; Iraq Interested in Tamara Radar Systems Plans for Sale, Lidove noviny, 10 September 1999; Czech Secret Service Denies Sale of Antiradar Device, Pravo (Prague), 11 September 1999; Czech Ministry Tries to Stop Tamara Firm Sale, Lidove noviny, 6 October 1999; Iraqi Agents Seek Information on Czech Komar-2 Radar, Pravo, 8 December 1999.
 
26 Jan Machacek, Maceks consultancy case lifts the cover on privatizationfees,’” Prague Business Journal, 17 September 2001.
 
27 Jan Machacek, CSSD-ODS opposition agreement: Here today and, very likely, here to stay, Prague Business Journal, 2 July 2001.
 
28 Constitutional Watch, East European Constitutional Review, 8, nos. 12 <http:/
/www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol8num1-2/constitutionwatch/czech.html> (2 May 2002).
 
29 Czech premier defends cabinet-sponsored anti-corruption campaign, CTK Czech News Agency, 11 June 2001.49P ATRONAGE AND C ORRUPTION IN THE C ZECH R EPUBLIC
 
30 Jitka Goetzova, Kavan Expects Praise from the EU for Wiping Out Economic Crime, Pravo, 25 July 2000.
 
31 Jiri Kubik, Clean Hands is Coming to an End, Mlada fronta Dnes, 15 August 2001.
 
32 Since CKA is not a bank, it will not fall under Czech National Bank regulations concerning transparency. Its original management was dismissed following the recent resignation of former Finance Minister Pavel Mertlik. Mertlik was an opponent of enterprising political interests.
33 In such circumstances, an entrepreneur could actually repurchase his own loan at a steep discount, regain title to the collateral, and have the Czech taxpayers cover the difference.
34 Jan Machacek, State leaping into privacy and grabbing power while the media sleep, Prague Business Journal, 1 October 2001.
35 The figure is based on the GDP for 2000, estimated at 1,968 billion crowns. Assets in the CKA amount to approximately 45,000 crowns per capita. SeeCzech Republic, EIU Country Profile 2001, 52. (Note: 1 USD equals 37.6 Czech crowns; The Economist, 1 December 2001). See also Hana Lesenarova, Gregrs investment council puts finishing touch on an old plan, Prague Business Journal,
8 October 2001.
36 These appointments represent only a few examples of a trend toward invoking an emergency procurement clause and bypassing the tender process altogether. The Office of Protection of Economic Competition, which oversees procurement law, has yet to seriously investigate any of these instances. Also, even when the tender process is employed, there have been numerous recent examples of opacity and suspected corruption in selecting winning bids.

37 Strangely, the winner, TDC (formerly Tele Danmark), was chosen without even negotiating a price. TDC purchased Radiokomunikace for 6.8 billion crowns and is now in the process of breaking the firm up and selling it off in partsthe mobile phone division alone is expected to fetch fifteen to twenty billion crowns.

38 Jan Machacek, Too much power concentrated in too few hands a bad thing for the public, Prague Business Journal, 4 February 2002.

39 Marek Prazak and Jiri Nadoba, Further Fouls in the Tender for the CEZ, Mlada fronta Dnes, 2 November 2001.

40 Machacek, Privatization unplugged.

41 A peculiar friendship has blossomed between Klauss ODS and Vladimir Zeleznys TV Nova, by far the most popular TV station in the country. In 1997, Klaus threatened Nova with a 100 million-crown lawsuit following an inaccurate report concerning his alleged ownership of a Swiss villa. Zelezny and Klaus settled the matter out of court, and the two have since embarked on a very profitable friendship. Jan Machacek, The odious and the ominous in Klaus meeting with Zelezny, Prague Business Journal, 26 November 2001.

42 Lauder provided the funding for Novas start-up in 1994, but Zelezny was able to force him out and retain the broadcast license through a technicality in Czech law in 1999. Last year, a Prague court legitimized this, recognizing Novas commercial and legal status. Zelezny is also the subject of numerous other lawsuits pending in Czech courts, some relating to tax evasion charges worth about 18 million crowns. See ibid. and Marius Dragomir, Court ruling on CME bad PR for CR, Prague Business Journal, 24 September 2001.50 SAIS Review SummerF ALL 2002

43 While people like Klaus, Motlik, and Zelezny might plausibly argue that the investigative weekly, Respekt, serves a similar function as a mouthpiece for
President Havel, it is doubtful that Respekts owner, Karel Schwarzenberg, has a similar vested interest in Havels political success.

44 Jan Machacek, The odious and the ominous in Klaus meeting with Zelezny, Prague Business Journal, 26 November 2001.

45 Mrnka had also headed CT during a crisis in 2000, when employees of the station protested and started their own broadcasts in response to the appointment of new management they believed was biased in favor of the ODS.
See Head of Czech TV political programmes axed following Speakers criticism, CTK Czech News Agency, 11 June 2001.

46 Marius Dragomir, Balvin elected to head Czech Television; member says council was pressured, Prague Business Journal, 5 November 2001.

47 Evidence of Kavans willful cooperation remains inconclusive, even though a book purporting to expose Kavans StB file sparked a heated controversy. UK Publicist Holding Czech Ministers StB File Since 1991, CTK Czech News Agency, 23 May 2000.

48 Sula: Bolshevization of Politics Legalising Communist Past, CTK Czech News Agency, 10 April 2000.

49 At the time of Zemans planned visit, Jedlicka was apparently trying to arrange the sale of U.S. F-16 fighters to the Czech Republic. While this may account for his involvement in Zemans trip, it offered no solace to the U.S. government to have an alleged gangster with established connections to Iraq arranging the sale of U.S. military technology. Jaroslav Spurny and Jindrich Sidlo, Miroslav Slouf, Our Man in NATO, Lidove noviny, 19 September 2000.

50 The journalists who published the leaked story later faced criminal prosecution for failing to reveal their source, but they were subsequently pardoned by President Havel. Prime Minister Zeman Will Dismiss Advisors Sima and Sarapatka, Pravo, 25 August 2000.

51 Before he was dismissed, Srba had been in charge of the Clean Hands anticorruption program at the Foreign Ministry. Jiri Kubik and Sabina Slonkova, Czech Official in Charge of Clean Hands Involved in Blackmail, Corruption, Mlada fronta Dnes, 26 June 2001.

52 Jaroslav Spurny, The President Is Pulling on the Emergency Brake; Purges in Elite Police Squad Underway, Lidove noviny, 14 March 2000.

53 Following the BIS investigation, Sirek was fired by the new Deputy Police President, Vaclav Jakubik. See ibid.

54 Machaceks trial, along with that of another officer accused with him, is currently in progress. Numerous irregularities surrounded the investigation and Machacek was indicted in spite of a solid alibihe was abroad on holiday when the alleged incident occurred. Former Czech Anti-Mafia Unit Head on Trial Framed by Mafia? Hospodarske noviny, 5 September 2001.

55 Ondrej Neumann, Ruml Knew About Contacts with Mafia, Lidove noviny, 25 October 1996.

56 Former Czech Anti-Mafia Unit Head on TrialFramed by Mafia? Hospodarske noviny, 5 September 2001.

57 Although the President can task the intelligence services, ultimate responsibility and authority over them lies with the government.

58 Jiri Kominek, Unsure Future for Czech Intelligence Services, Janes Intelligence Review 12, no. 5 (1 May 2000): 16-17.

59 Czech Premier loses dispute over work of elite police units, Lidove noviny, 19 July 2000.

60 One former business partner is longtime master StB spy, Miroslav Cemus.

61 Mikhailov was also present at U Holubu during Machaceks famous raid, and he received a ten-year prohibition on entering the Czech Republic. Jindrich Sidlo and Jakub Unger, Policemans Problem: Mafia? Police Corps Number Two Has Problems Passing Security Clearance, Mlada fronta Dnes, 12 October 2001.

62 Jaroslav Spurny, Security clearance finished, forget it, Respekt, 25 March 2002.

63 When questioned about Jedlickas involvement in the proposed US trip, and about the alarm expressed by U.S. officials, Zeman offhandedly dismissed the whole issue and denied any such conversation with (then) U.S. Ambassador John# Shattuck. He claimed that their conversation had instead focused on trade relations between the two countries and jibbed the press with the comment thatthe export of cheeses is far less attractive to the media than some Mafioso.
See, Zeman has denied Respekts assertion that he is not going to the US because of a Mafioso, Pravo, 19 September 2000.

64 Havel Suspects Slouf of Trying to Destabilize Police, Mlada fronta Dnes, 28 March 2000.

65 Kominek, Unsure Future for Czech Intelligence Services.

66 Walter Mayr, Brothers, to the Sun, to Karlovy Vary, Hamburg Der Spiegel, 24 April 2000.

67 Czech secret service accuses Russia of attempts to penetrate ministries, CTK Czech News Agency, 24 October 2001.

68 Mafias operating in Czech Republic adopt more classy approach, Mlada fronta Dnes, 12 July 2001.

69 Journalists who have tried to ascertain more about Falkon have found only a series of dead ends. The company does not maintain a website, and its representatives refuse to answer any questions. The address listed as its headquarters in the Prague commercial registry is that of a Dominican monastery, but the gatekeeper of the monastery insists he has only heard of Falkon as a result of the constant inquiries made as to its whereabouts. Also, the registered address in Prague of Paala Mamaladze, one of Falkons main principals, is nonexistent. Other principal members of the firm are two Swiss brothers named Moser, from the small town of Neuhausen, where Falkon also has an office. Two journalists from Respekt magazine visited the office to inquire about the transaction and, not surprisingly, were unable to garner information from firm representatives. What was surprising was that, in this town of 7,000, nobody seemed to have heard of the Moser brothers or of this hometown firm, Falkon Capital, currently making such a name for itself in the world of high-profile sovereign debt collection.

70 Roman Kupchinsky, The Two Headed FalkonOne Scenario, Crime, Corruption and Terrorism Watch, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2, no. 5 (11 February 2002), <www.rferl.org >.

71 Jan Kovalik and Jaroslav Spurny, The Swiss falcon shows the white feather, Respekt, 29 October 2001.

72 Jaroslav Spurny, The dark path of Russian billions, Respekt, 18 March 2002.

73 Jaroslav Spurny, Russias debt a prime-time issue again, Respekt, 21 January 2002.52 SAIS Review SummerF ALL 2002

74 Milos Zeman: Do Not Behave Like Blockheads, Lidove noviny, 8 February 2002.

75 Spurny, Russias debt a prime-time issue again.

76 James Pitkin, U.S. hedges on giving up classified nuclear data, The Prague Post, 6 March 2002.

77 Poll shows majority of population consider Czech Republic corrupt nation,’” Czech News Agency CTK, 11 July 2001.

78 The potential economic impact of political control over the privatization process and corporate restructurings could be enormous, particularly since the Czechs are already among the most heavily taxed people in the world. Karanycky et al., Nations In Transit 2001, 168.

79 The large public outcry against political appointments made at Czech TV in late 2000 could certainly be seen as a step in the right direction.

80 This genuine political opposition in the current government was principally led by the center-right, pro-Western Christian Democratic Union and Freedom Union.
81 Prague Business Journal, 7 February 2002.

82 Jan Machacek, CSSD-ODS opposition agreement: Here today andvery likelyhere to stay, Prague Business Journal, 2 July 2001.

83 Internal EU politics also obscured the truth in this latest report. For example, irregularities in EdFs courting of the Czech government in the CEZ privatization were ignored, most probably because of lobbying from the French state-owned electricity producer. Jan Machacek, EU report reveals special interests and little about real problems, Prague Business Journal, 19 November 2001. 
 

Czech election: Meet the new anti-corruption party that wants to clean up the Czech Republic

 
 
Czech Republic's Prime Minister Andrej Babis makes a statement on video during the EU Council summit in Brussels, Belgium, July 20, 2020
 

Andrej Babis began life as an anti-corruption crusader. So what happened?

In the days leading up to the October 8-9 general election in the Czech Republic, Prime Minister Andrej Babis faced renewed scrutiny over alleged corruption.

Babis, the second-richest person in the Czech Republic and who the European Commission recently found to be in conflict of interest over his business dealings, is now under pressure to explain a convoluted offshore structure he used to purchase a €15m mansion in the south of France, as disclosed in the “Pandora Papers”, the largest ever trove of leaked offshore data.

During a televised election debate at the weekend, he blamed the “Czech mafia” for the allegations surrounding a house purchase that he said dated back to 2009. On Sunday night, he tweeted that he thought the reports were intentionally published days ahead of next weekend’s general election to undermine his campaign.

In recent months, Babis’ ruling ANO party has soared in the polls. Its support dwindled to near-record lows in early 2021 because of the Czech Republic’s woeful pandemic record, when it had one of the world’s highest infection rates per capita.

But ANO’s popularity has recovered as most lockdown measures were lifted in the summer and infection numbers remain relatively low.

The latest survey by STEM, a local pollster, gives ANO 27.3% of the vote, about six percentage points ahead of the second-place SPOLU alliance, formed earlier this

The STEM poll also puts the anti-corruption Prisaha (or “Oath”) party in sixth place with 5.7% of the vote, its biggest tally in months and enough for it to enter parliament.

The election on October 8-9 is expected to be tightly fought. No clear winner is projected and some analysts forecast a protracted post-election standoff between the main parties, as each makes an attempt to form a government. A full-blown constitutional crisis is possible.

The new party trying to keep corruption in Czech

One of the biggest developments could be the success of Prisaha, formed earlier this year by a retired investigator of organised crime, Robert Slachta.

It is one of a new breed of single-issue, anti-corruption parties that have sprung up in recent years across Central and Eastern Europe.

At last year’s general election in neighbouring Slovakia, which split from the Czech Republic in 1993, the anti-corruption Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) party came out of nowhere to win the ballot, starting an anti-graft campaign that has seen a widespread clearout of the Slovak bureaucracy and judiciary.

Ivana Karaskova, from the Association for International Affairs in Prague, said that anti-corruption narratives have a long history in Czech politics.

“ANO has won elections based on a pretence that Babiš is not a part of the establishment and that he would deal with [a] corrupted political elite,” she said, referring to the party’s victory at the 2017 election when it campaigned heavily on an anti-corruption platform.

“Corruption as a topic, either the real one or imaginary, seems to resonate well with the electorate and Prisaha is just one of the political subjects which discovered that,” Karaskova said.

The Czech Republic was ranked last in an evaluation of 42 countries by the Council of Europe's anti-corruption body, GRECO, for not following its recommendations since 2019. It was also ranked 49th worst out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s latest Corruption Perceptions Index.

According to the same organisation’s Global Corruption Barometer report, published in June, some 69% of Czechs said their government performed badly at tackling corruption, the third-worst score in the EU. In late 2019, more than 300,000 Czechs demonstrated against Babis’ alleged corruption in what were the largest protests since the fall of communism in 1989.

According to the latest opinion polls, Prisaha now commands more support than most of the other small parties and could even beat the Social Democrats (CSSD), the country’s once-dominant centre-left outfit that could this year fail to win seats in parliament.

Slachta came to public attention as the head of the Unit for Combating Organised Crime, and his investigations into official corruption brought down the coalition government of Prime Minister Petr Necas in 2013. His autobiography, Thirty Years Under Oath, from which his new party takes its name, was a best-seller when it was published last year.

But question marks remain over whether Prisaha can maintain its position over the coming week, especially as pollsters find that roughly a third of voters are still undecided.

“Prisaha has voters whose relationship to the party is very weak and uncertain,” noted Lubomir Kopecek, a professor of political science at Masaryk University.

Analysts reckon that many of Prisaha’s early supporters were former voters for the ruling ANO party, which dwindled in the opinion polls for most of 2021.

A recent survey by Kantar CZ and Data Collect, two local pollsters, asserted that Prisaha has an electoral potential of up to 9.5 per cent, higher than the current opinion polls that are slightly skewed by the significant number of non-committed voters among the Czech electorate.

There is also some doubt whether a single-issue party led by a charismatic figure is the proper way to go about fighting endemic corruption.

“Corruption is a strong theme in Czech politics and Czech democracy is still quite immature,” said Jiri Pehe, a political analyst and a director of New York University´s Prague campus. “So enough people are still attracted by parties led by strongmen, who promise to use their power to fight corruption and other social ills,” he added.

The corruption allegations against Czech PM Andrej Babis

What’s more, without a change of leadership in the Czech Republic analysts reckon there will be little progress in anti-corruption efforts.

“Elections and political will are the bases on which an anti-corruption drive starts”, said Richard Q. Turcsanyi, an Assistant Professor at Mendel University in Brno.

If Babis is elected again and President Milos Zeman is willing to protect him, it’s very difficult to imagine any success for an anti-corruption drive against people connected to the leadership, he added.

For years analysts have alleged that President Zeman, who is also dogged by corruption allegations, has pulled some strings to stop investigations into Babis’ business affairs. Zeman has also already said that he will allow Babis the chance to form the next government, even if one of the two opposition alliances wins the upcoming election.

Most allegations against Babis stem from his ownership of the conglomerate Agrofert, one of the Czech Republic’s largest firms. In the past, Czech police investigated alleged misuse of EU subsidies to finance the “Stork's Nest” hotel-resort owned by Agrofert, although these have stalled.

In April this year, a European Commission audit found that Babis had breached the bloc’s conflict-of-interest rules when his company was paid EU subsidies while he was prime minister.

It found that he still directed the firm’s decisions despite him formally putting his assets into blind trust funds, and Agrofert was ordered to repay €17m in subsidies it had taken from the European bloc.

This could have major ramifications for the Czech Republic since the European Commission intimated earlier this year that it could face delays in accessing vital EU funds until the government makes progress on its anti-graft efforts. The Czech Republic has been a net beneficiary of EU funds since it joined the bloc in 2004.

It could also have wider ramifications for Babis himself. Analysts have speculated that if ANO loses power after next weekend’s election, the next government could restart domestic police investigations into Babis’ Agrofert and his alleged corrupt dealings.

Although his ANO party is widely tipped to win the election that starts on Friday, it is highly unlikely to win enough seats in parliament to be able to rule alone and its current allies are fading in the polls.

The Social Democrats, the junior partner in ANO’s ruling coalition since 2018, are on only 4.4% of the vote, which would mean the party fails to enter parliament for the first time ever, according to the latest STEM poll.

After 2018, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) backed up Babis’ minority government in parliament but it withdrew its support earlier this year and there’s no guarantee of it backing ANO again. The KSCM is currently polling on around 6.5% of the vote, according to STEM, down from the 7.8% it won at the last general election, which means it could control fewer parliamentary seats come next week.

The Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) has said it won’t cooperate with Babis, and he would face a considerable backlash if he tries to form an alliance with the controversial far-right party, which is polling at around 12%. None of the other smaller parties that would likely ally with Babis are expected to win seats in parliament.

Rumours also abound that Babis could try to cut a post-election deal with one of the larger opposition parties if he isn’t able to form a stable government. The centre-right ODS might agree to work in coalition with ANO on the condition that Babis does not remain prime minister, Karaskova told Euronews in an earlier-published article. This could come with the tacit promise of clemency for Babis.

“Babis is scared,” said a source close to the current cabinet, who requested anonymity. “He knows that if he loses the election, he could also lose his freedom.”

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SPARE THE ROD, SPOIL THE CHILD? CZECHIA MOVES AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT FOR CHILDREN

Prague  BIRN July 4, 2023

Spare the Rod, Spoil the Child? Czechia Moves Against Corporal Punishment for Children | Balkan Insight

While the Czech Republic remains one of the last EU countries lacking explicit legal provisions against the use of corporal punishment on children at home, a new push seeks to remind parents that physical violence should be used neither as a first, second nor last resort to discipline their kids.

At the beginning of June, the Czech Justice Ministry unveiled the Childhood Without Violence Initiative aimed at reforming the Civil Code and bringing the Czech Republic up to date with its international obligations on child protection and the fight against domestic violence.

The amendment, which is expected to be submitted to Czech MPs over the summer, is meant to declare the inadmissibility of physical punishment on children at home (its use is already illegal at day-care centres and at school) – a practice the UN defines as “any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however light.”

“The Czech Civil Code contains similar declaratory provisions,” Deputy Ombudsman Vit Alexander Schorm tells BIRN. “For instance, that spouses should be faithful to each other or that children should respect their parents. In this way, as a society, we subscribe to values that are important to us, and I believe that such core values in the 21st century include a simple fact that ‘we don’t hit children’.”

Slow to catch up

The Czech Republic has long been lagging in that area. Since Sweden became the first country to do so in 1979, at least 65 countries around the world have fully banned corporal punishment of children, including most European states. Initially slow, the momentum gained speed after the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, making the Czech Republic one of the last remaining countries in the EU today not to have such legal provisions.

A 2014 reform of the Civil Code did strengthen the protection of children at home, stating that “educational means can be used only in the form and extent as is reasonable, does not endanger the health of the child or its development and does not affect the human dignity of the child.”

Lacking any explicit prohibition of violence, the amendment did not go far enough according to children’s rights advocates, and the following year the Czech Republic was declared in violation of the European Social Charter by the Council of Europe.

Over the past ten years, successive Czech governments have, nevertheless, deemed current legislation sufficient to protect children against “excessive” and “unreasonable” cases of violence at home, while occasionally organising awareness-raising campaigns to promote “good parenting” methods.

The status-quo has prevailed since, with authorities reluctant to instruct parents what they’re allowed to do to educate and discipline their children behind closed doors, or to tell them what’s off limits.

No harm, no foul?

As a result, there has been very little change over the past decades in how Czech parents relate to the use of corporal violence against their children, studies show.

A 2018 research by the Open Men’s League showed that about two-thirds of them declared they used or would be ready to use physical punishment to deal with their offspring’s misbehaviour or to discipline them when necessary. Most Czech parents also believed that it remains a parental prerogative to do so if they consider it beneficial or necessary to the child’s upbringing.

“This trend is not over yet, and we are yet to see a generational change in this area,” notes Wunschova of Centrum LOCIKA which, in its eight years of existence, has dealt with and cared for more than 2,500 children exposed to physical and domestic violence in the Czech Republic.

According to her, “the bad experience with state interference in the intimate space of the family, the disturbed intergenerational empathy, and the low awareness of parents about the impact of so-called ‘ordinary educational violence’ on their children play a significant role” to explain why “so many parents, simply trying to raise their children well, believe that physical punishment is a good way to give them order, set boundaries and build resilience.”

There are also more pervasive reasons why parents in the Czech Republic and elsewhere may be reluctant to change their ways, especially when the same disciplining means are “passed down” from one generation to the next: younger parents admitting that the use of physical punishment against their own child may be considered “wrong” or “abusive” amounts to conceding that what their own parents did to them was also wrong, and that they themselves were unwilling victims.

A “protectiveness” exists towards the methods used by our own parents, which is usually justified by “we were occasionally slapped as kids and turned out fine” or other statements to the effect of dismissing the need for any kind of blanket ban, experts note.

“The fact that there is a strong trans-generational transmission is a big factor,” underlines Deputy Ombudsman Schorm. “Children tend to take what happens at home as a norm, and when they grow up, repeat the methods or patterns they themselves experienced as children.”

Vit Alexander Schorm, Czech Deputy Ombudsman.

A loving smack?

Regardless of the moral debate, social and psychological studies have long shown that even the most common forms of physical violence perpetrated by parents on their children are counterproductive and can have serious long-term consequences.

“All corporal punishment carries an inbuilt risk of escalation,” warns the World Health Organisation, citing a string of possible outcomes to show that the risks, quite simply, outweigh the potential benefits: physical and mental ill-health, low self-esteem, poor educational outcomes, impaired cognitive development, increased aggression, damaged parent-child relationship, etc.

“We have a lot of evidence to say that there are several harmful effects, even for measures that are considered mild,” commented Pavla Gomba, head of UNICEF Czech Republic, which conducted a poll that found that about 11 per cent of children experienced some form of violence at home. “There is also no evidence that physical punishment changes the original unwanted behaviour of the child.”

In other words, it is unlikely a child would see a “loving smack” or “harmless spank” as either loving or harmless, and very likely the punishment will have the opposite effect than intended. Not to mention studies indicating how mild forms of corporal punishment may lead to more brutal instances of physical violence and child abuse.

For Wunschova, all this evidence shows the absurdity of “the question of how much a parent can hit their child to make it okay.”

“The only correct answer is not at all”, she argues.

Asked how the law might be able to differentiate between mild cases of corporal punishment for disciplinary purposes, excessive physical violence and outright child abuse, Schorm is equally adamant: “That’s exactly the problem here! It’s not possible. The only way to protect children is to make it clear that any physical contact intended to cause pain or discomfort is not an acceptable way to raise children or to resolve conflicts.”

Far from calling for state powers to prosecute or fine misbehaving parents, proponents are hopeful that a new amendment would change societal behaviour, citing studies from Sweden and around the world showing how a legal ban commonly leads to significant decreases in the use of corporal punishment on children at home, as well as in its overall acceptance in society at large.

Their overall message seems to be: while a quick slap on the hand or smack on the cheek may be the easiest disciplinary measure and does not necessarily amount to child abuse, there is always an alternative to physical violence. And this alternative, they argue, should always be favoured.

But many parents “lack the experience that it can be otherwise, that the child-parent relationship can be respectful without the parent losing authority,” Wunschova tells BIRN. “Often, they also do not have the necessary information or reason to change their behaviour because it is commonly tolerated, sometimes even demanded in society.”

Describing the need to enact the inadmissibility of corporal punishment as “the beginning of a journey rather than an end in itself,” Deputy Ombudsman Schorm hopes it will become “a stimulus for a society-wide discussion and a subsequent rethinking of how we view raising children”, as long as the legal change is accompanied by a comprehensive information campaign, the strengthening of preventive services for children and the possibility of counselling for parents.

“I sincerely believe that in 10 years’ time, we will see the current debate about whether and how hitting children can be seen as an absurd relic,” Wunschova concludes.

 

Czech election: Will the vote prompt Prague to turn its back on Russia and China?

 Czech election: Will the vote prompt Prague to turn its back on Russia and China? | Euronews

China's President Xi Jinping, right, shakes hands with Czech Republic's President Milos Zeman before their meeting in Beijing Sunday, April 28, 2019

By David Hutt

Relations have already frayed considerably over the past year

The Czech Republic’s ties with China and Russia are tipped to either remain as they are -- a mixture of caution and dented optimism -- or get considerably worse after the upcoming general election on October 8-9.

And there is little expectation of improvement in the relations that have frayed considerably over the past twelve months.

Much depends on the composition of the next coalition government, which is looking increasingly hard to predict.

Some analysts speculate that the Central European state could be heading towards a constitutional crisis.

A brief history of Czech relations with China and Russia

Relations with China and Russia, which were shunned after the end of communism in 1989, went through a brief period of resurgence in the middle of the last decade as the newly elected president, Milos Zeman, sought to alter the Czech establishment’s traditional attachments to the United States, European Union and NATO.

After his presidential victory in 2013, Zeman became the loudest proponent of opening up to the East, motivated by China’s global economic rise and Russia's return as a geopolitical entity in Europe. He found some support from across the political spectrum.

In 2012, then-Prime Minister Petr Necas, from the centre-right Civic Democrats (ODS), had mocked the country’s traditional values-driven foreign policy as “just a trend” and appealed for economic concerns to trump squeamishness over China or Russia’s human rights record. Zeman also found some support in the coalition government that took power in 2013, led by his former party, the Social Democrats (CSSD).

In 2015, Zeman boasted that the Czech Republic could be China’s “gateway” to Europe, a comment made when in Beijing as the only European head of state in antecedence for a military parade to mark the end of the Second World War.

Around the same time, Zeman was also one of the few European premiers who visited a similar ceremonial event in Moscow, where he spoke in favour of renewed relations with his counterpart, Vladimir Putin. Zeman had previously defended Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Some inward investment began to flow from China. CEFC China Energy, one of China’s largest privately-owned firms, snapped up several well-known Czech brands, including the country’s historic football team, Slavia Prague. CEFC founder, Ye Jianming, was named an advisor to Zeman in 2017 and appointed some of the president’s associates, such as former defence minister Jaroslav Tvrdik, as executives on CEFC-owned entities.

Ye’s business empire crumbled after he was arrested for corruption in Beijing in 2018. Another Chinese firm, the state-owned CITIC Group, moved in to buy up its Czech investments.

But the promised billions of investment from China never materialised. Estimates vary, but it is believed that only around €1 billion worth of Chinese capital has flowed into the Czech Republic, a trifling figure compared with the billions of euros China had poured into its Central European neighbour Hungary.

Even Zeman threatened in January 2020 to boycott an upcoming meeting of the “17+1” forum, a China-led dialogue with Central and Eastern European states, over the lack of investment from Beijing.

“I don’t think the Chinese side has done what it promised,” the Czech President commented, although he later reversed his decision.

The opening up to Russia and China was never official Czech policy. The coalition government that took charge in 2018, led by Prime Minister Andrej Babis’ populist ANO party, was agnostic about the idea though expressed support if it brought economic benefits.

Instead, it was led by a coterie of President Zeman, who is supposed to hold mere ceremonial powers, well-connected former politicians and the country’s business tycoons.

But this coalition inspired a backlash from the Czech security establishment, whose affiliations have long been to the United States and NATO, as well as from opposition politicians who argued that warming relations with Beijing and Moscow was a repudiation of the country’s historic liberal-inspired foreign agenda.

The breaking point over China came in the summer of last year when the president of the Czech Senate, Milos Vystrcil, paid a visit to Taiwan, which the Beijing government claims still belongs to the People’s Republic. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, reacted furiously and threatened to punish the Czech Republic, which only seemed to galvanise the country’s anti-Beijing voices.

President Zeman, increasingly isolated, cut off talks with Vystrcil, the third most senior political official, and escalated his long-running feud with the Czech intelligence agency (BIS), which warned against allowing Chinese and Russian firms to invest in the country’s strategic assets.

The coalition government, the occupier of the middle ground between the country’s pro-east and pro-west factions, appeared to take the side of the latter when in February this year it disqualified a Chinese state-owned firm from the pre-qualification tender for the planned €7.5 billion expansion of the Dukovany nuclear power plant, although a Russian firm will still be allowed to take part.

The Czech government has also stepped up its associations with Taiwan, including donating a symbolic 30,000 COVID-19 vaccines to the contested island in July.

At the same time, attempts to reconnect Czech relations with Russia, considered by many Czechs as a former imperial aggressor because of the Soviet Union’s past domination of Central Europe, also appeared to grind to a halt.

Relations deteriorated considerably in April of this year when Prime Minister Babis accused two Russian intelligence agents of being behind the major explosions at a munition depot in the southeast of the Czech Republic in 2014. The same pair, Czech intelligence said, carried out the 2018 poisoning of the former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Britain.

The Czech Republic’s accusation was followed by the expulsion of diplomats by both countries and warnings of retaliation from Moscow.

How could the election change things?

Because of these events, it would now be difficult to get any political momentum behind more positive relations with Moscow and Beijing, said Ivana Karaskova, of the Association for International Affairs in Prague.

“The overall sentiment in the Czech Republic’s policy circles, excluding the extreme political parties, is cautious,” she added.

According to a survey published earlier this year by Sinophone Borderlands, a project run by Palacky University Olomouc, some 29% of Czech respondents held “very negative” and 27% “negative” views of China.

Of all the political parties, supporters of the far-left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) and far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) had the most positive views of China, the survey found. The two parties’ leaders themselves are also among the most positive about building relations with Beijing and Moscow.

Much depends on the outcome of next month’s general election, which is set to take place on October 8. Analysts reckon the Czech Republic could be heading towards either a major post-election stalemate or even a constitutional crisis.

The ballot looks set to be dominated by the current ruling party, Babis’ ANO, and two new coalitions formed by the largest opposition parties, none of which will likely control enough seats in parliament to go it alone, according to the latest opinion polls.

President Zeman has also intimated that he doesn’t like the new alliances and wants to allow the biggest single party to try to form the next government - and possibly allow it to remain in power even if parliament doesn’t give it a vote of confidence.

According to the latest opinion polls, Babis’ ANO party is widely tipped to take first place and he is expected to have a first crack at forming a minority government, although it remains unclear with whom since ANO’s current coalition partner, the CSSD, could fail to even win seats in parliament next month.

If ANO is able to form a government, perhaps with the support of other smaller parties, then relations with Russia and China will remain as they are now, said Jiri Pehe, a political analyst and a director of New York University´s Prague campus.

According to Karaskova, of the Association for International Affairs, because Babis has no interest in foreign policy he may again offer the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a coalition partner. Since 2017 that cabinet post has been controlled by the CSSD, the junior coalition partner.

The Social Democrats’ views on Russia and China are mixed. Many of the party’s former grandees, including President Zeman, are among the most passionate advocates of an Eastwards-looking foreign policy.

And a report by the now-named MapInfluenCE, a project run by the Prague-based Association for International Affairs, has argued that links between the Chinese Communist Party and the CSSD are “personally guaranteed” by Jan Hamacek, the current CSSD leader and Minister of Interior.

But CSSD member Tomas Petricek, who served as foreign minister from 2018 until April this year, frequently warned about risks posed by Russia and China, and some analysts speculated that his dismissal was due to his pro-Western stance.

On the other hand, the expected post-election frenzy might instead see the Czech Republic’s two new opposition coalitions try to form a government, in which case the country would take a much more hardline position on China and Russia, Pehe said.

The SPOLU alliance was formed earlier this year by the centre-right ODS, the current largest opposition party, and the smaller Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and TOP 09. The progressive Pirate Party, currently the country’s second-largest opposition outfit, formed a separate electoral pact with the Mayors and Independents party (STAN).

While there’s much daylight between the two coalitions on domestic politics, they have notably taken strong stances against Chinese and Russian influence in the country and both advocate for a liberal, westwards-looking foreign policy.

The Czech senate president who visited Taiwan last year, which precipitated much of the current antagonism with Beijing, is a senior member of ODS. Pirate member Zdenek Hrib has pursued openly anti-Beijing and anti-Moscow policies since becoming mayor of Prague in 2018, including replacing the Czech capital’s sister-city relationship with Beijing for one with Taipei.

In the earlier-mentioned Sinophone Borderlands survey of public opinion, the most negative views on China were held by supporters of centrist TOP-09, with around 80% holding negative opinions, followed by ODS and STAN. More than two-thirds of supporters of the Pirates Party held negative views on China.

The SPOLU alliance’s campaign website states that it would pursue “unambiguous orientation to the West,” although it makes no specific mention of China. The Czech Republic faces “hostile action from undemocratic regimes,” meaning Russia and China, asserts the manifesto of the Pirates and Mayors alliance. Similar to SPLOU, it argues for a Western-orientated foreign policy that more closely aligns the Czech Republic to the EU and NATO.

But even in the unlikely scenario that an opposition alliance takes power after next month’s elections, the country’s foreign policy agenda is likely to become increasingly tribal, with the government pulling one way and a coterie led by President Zeman still pushing the other.

After all, Zeman is going to stay in office until the next presidential election in 2023, noted Richard Q. Turcsanyi, a programme director at the Central European Institute of Asian Studies at Palacky University Olomouc.

“Although not a head of the government, Zeman is very influential,” he added.

And the Czech president shows no signs of giving up his friendships in China. Following a phone call between him and Chinese President Xi Jinping in July, it was announced that Zeman will visit Beijing next year, his sixth visit as president.

Perhaps one of the most important tasks of the next Czech government will be to refashion how the country’s foreign policy agenda is set, disentangling the many vested interests that have fractured the agenda in recent years.

As the manifesto of the Pirates and Mayors alliance puts it: “the discrepancy in foreign policy between the president, the prime minister, the foreign minister and other actors is harmful.”

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Corruption still prevalent in Czechia according to worldwide ranking - Prague, Czech Republic 

 
Illustrative image / iStock 

Corruption still prevalent in Czechia according to worldwide ranking

Transparency International says Czechia has been treading water for 15 years and lacks the courage to make needed reforms.

Written by Expats.cz Staff Published on 31.01.2023 

The Czech Republic ranked 41st out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Czechia improved over the previous index, scoring 56 out of 100 points, two more than one year ago. Despite the improvement, it is still eight points behind the EU average.

After it was in the 19th position in the 27-member EU for three years, Czechia moved up to 16th to tie with Italy and Slovenia. The lowest rankings in the EU go to Bulgaria, with 43 points, and Hungary, with 42 points.

Among the Visegrád (V4) countries, Czechia took the lead for the first time, overtaking Poland, which dropped to 55 points. On the other hand, Slovakia added another point, rising to 53 points. Hungary was last in the V4.

Denmark led the ranking with 90 points, followed by Finland and New Zealand, each with 87 points. On the contrary, Syria, and South Sudan ranked worst with 13 points, followed by Somalia at 12 points.

Lack of a clear strategy

The Czech branch of Transparency International said curbing corruption is still faltering in Czechia. Progress in the long term has been “two steps forward and two steps back” with politicians lacking a clear strategy and the will for making systemic changes.

Most anti-corruption laws put in place over the past decade are due to European legislation related to Czechia's EU membership, Transparency International added.

Ondřej Kopečný, the director of the Czech branch, said the current government of Prime Minister Petr Fiala has not brought significant change, even though replacing former Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, who had been caught up in a corruption scandal and conflict-of-interest accusations, was a positive step.

“It seems that [the government] was satisfied with the fact that Andrej Babiš is no longer the prime minister and forgot that he can be one again,” Kopečný said.

“The government coalition has not yet found the courage to amend the absolutely toothless law on the conflict of interest. Its proposal to protect whistle-blowers is only a shadow of a truly effective solution, and weak plans to regulate lobbying do not raise high hopes either,” Kopečný said.

Kopečný added that the government’s attitude toward incidents of corruption is also disappointing. “If [the incidents] concern their members, we can hear lots of excuses, downplaying of information or installing suspected politicians into advisory posts, like in the past,” he said.

Not sinking, but not significantly improving

Petr Leyer, a lawyer and board member of the Czech branch, said the CPI needs to be looked at in the long term as it shows the development and trends of the given society. “Czechia has clearly been treading water for 15 years. It is not markedly sinking like, for example, Hungary, but it has not been improving in general,” Leyer said.

In connection with the war in Ukraine and Russian aggression, Transparency International pointed out that Russia dropped one point to score 28 points and at the same time fell one place to 137th, which puts them in last place in Europe. Ukraine, on the other hand, improved by one point to reach 33 points and jumped from 122nd to 116th place.

 
 

'Czexit': What chance of a referendum on the Czech Republic quitting the EU?

Tomio Okamura leader of Czech far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy speaks during a rally organized by League leader Matteo Salvini

By David Hutt

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Czech Republic's ruling party may need post-election support from a right-wing movement that wants a referendum on leaving the EU.

Czechs have no great affinity for the European Union - in fact, they are among the most sceptical of the bloc.

But since their country is a net beneficiary of funds from Brussels and there currently exists no means of holding a referendum, a “Czexit” has remained the pipe dream of far-right parties and Eurosceptic columnists.

However, there’s a slim chance of a referendum if the country’s leading eurosceptic party is able to gain access to the corridors of power amid the political turmoil expected after the country's October 8-9 general election.

But much comes down to electoral arithmetic. The ruling ANO party is tipped to win the ballot that takes place today and Saturday but its current partners are projected to lose seats.

Unable to command a majority, Prime Minister Andrej Babis might have to turn to the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD) -- the loudest proponent of a plebiscite on leaving the EU -- for backing.

Referendum on Czechs leaving EU 'improbable'

Japan-born Tomio Okamura, the leader of the anti-immigration SPD, said in a recent press conference that passing a new law to allow national referendums, including on EU membership, was his condition for supporting Babis’ campaign for a second term in office.

The majority of commentators reckon it's improbable, however, even if the SPD ends up supporting Babis in the next government.

“An EU referendum is unlikely to the point of impossibility,” said Sean Hanley, an associate professor in Central and Eastern European politics at University College London.

An early 2020 study by the Behavio research agency found that Czech public approval of EU membership was the lowest in the 27 member states, with only 33% saying it was a good thing. Some 15% of respondents said it was bad, the third-highest of the 27 nationalities, and just 47% said they would vote to remain in the bloc.

Despite the public mood, none of the main political parties supports leaving the EU and most importantly its funds, of which the Czech Republic has been a net recipient since it joined in 2004. It is expected to receive more than €7 billion from Brussels between now and 2026 as part of the EU’s recovery fund, as well as other grants from the bloc.

The centre-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the country’s second-largest party, has Eurosceptic ideas but is committed to reforming the bloc from the inside, not leaving.

The ODS will challenge this weekend’s ballot as part of the SPOLU alliance, currently tipped to come in a close second behind ANO, according to the latest opinion polls.

The libertarian Pirate Party and Mayors and Independents party (STAN), whose alliance is expected to finish some way behind in third, are firm pro-EU advocates.

The Czech constitution currently does not have rules on holding national plebiscites. Only one has been held since the Czech Republic was formed in 1993 when 77% of voters voted in favour to join the EU in a 2003 referendum.

The SPD -- tipped to finish fourth with between 10-12% of the vote -- has long campaigned for constitutional reform. Their numerous proposals have all been rejected by parliament.

But the current governing coalition, with support from the Pirates, had tabled their own motion on a referendum law, although it would forbid any scrutiny of EU and NATO membership. Because the lower chamber has dissolved ahead of this weekend's election, the motion failed to get a proper reading.

The SPD has some support for holding a referendum on EU membership. The far-left Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), tipped to pick up between 5-6.5% of the vote this weekend, is in favour of putting the question to the public, as are the smaller far-right parties that are unlikely to win seats.

The KSCM has supported the outgoing government in parliament since 2018, a position the SPD could find itself in after this weekend’s general election.

In the past, ANO and the SPD said they couldn’t work together, and similar allegations that Babis would partner with Okamura after the last general election proved false.

“Babis would not be excited about the cooperation with the SPD, but if he does not have another possibility, it is possible,” Lubomir Kopecek, a professor of political science at Masaryk University, told Euronews last month.

Opinion polls on the eve of the election suggest the Social Democrats (CSSD), the junior partner in the outgoing ANO-led government, will either lose seats or could even fail to enter parliament. The KSCM is also tipped to drop seats.

Without this support, Babis will struggle to boast enough MPs to win a vote of confidence in parliament, which he will need if President Milos Zeman recommends him as the next prime minister.

What could the post-election landscape look like?

Pundits reckon it is possible that the far-right party wouldn’t formally join ANO in government but offer its support in parliament, as the KSCM has done since 2018. In return, the SPD could demand that Babis agrees to back its referendum plans.

This could also work in Zeman’s interest, recently wrote the journalist Tim Gosling. “Zeman is expected to push Babis to swiftly start working with the SPD and any other illiberal parties that make it to parliament,” he asserted, adding that the SPD and KSCM support Zeman’s pro-Russia and pro-China agenda.

Back in 2016, after the British referendum on leaving the EU, President Zeman also said he was in favour of Czechs holding a similar plebiscite. Although he vowed to campaign to remain in the bloc, he said he would do “everything for [Czechs] to have a referendum and be able to express themselves. And the same goes for a NATO exit too.”

After a meeting with Zeman late last month, the SPD leader Okamura said that in return for the SPD supporting ANO, “one of the fundamental conditions is for the government manifesto ... to include a referendum law including the possibility of a referendum on leaving the EU or potentially NATO.”

Radim Fiala, SPD's deputy leader, also said in a recent interview with the Dnes newspaper that his party might agree to support ANO if it backed the far-right party’s plans for a national referendum law.

“There is no way Babis wants to contemplate Czexit both because he has a realistic appreciation of the Czech republic’s economic interests and of his own, which are closely tied to Germany and Western Europe,” said Hanley, of University College London.

If Babis and Okamura were to work together it would unlikely be in the form of a coalition, which would damage both of their reputations, Hanley added. So with some arrangement less than a coalition, the SPD’s condition on a referendum would more easily be forgotten about. “Okamura has actually worded it in such a way that he can wriggle out of it,” Hanley said.

For Babis, this could be a “deft tactical move, relying on a negative outcome,” wrote Radko Kubicko, a prominent Czech opinion columnist, in an article this week for Czech Radio.

On the one hand, he could win the SPD’s much-needed backing in parliament by agreeing to such a law. On the other hand, because Babis wouldn’t want to govern in a country wrecked by the havoc of leaving the EU, he would have to wager a 'Czechxit' referendum would never actually happen or, if it did, the Czech electorate would vote against it.

Yet it could end up in a similar situation as in Britain when then-Prime Minister David Cameron launched the Brexit referendum believing that it would be easily defeated and quieten the eurosceptic-wing of his Conservative Party, a plan that backfired.

“Although it seems that the topic of a 'Czexit' is only a secondary issue in Czech politics, after the elections... it might not be the case,” Kubicko wrote.

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Petr Fiala is the leader of center-right SPOLU (Together) alliance.
 
By Euronews
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While parties have agreed on a coalition, the forming of a government has been complicated by the ill-health of President Miloš Zeman.

The Czech Republic is nearing a new government after liberal parties reached an agreement, three weeks after parliamentary elections.

Petr Fiala, a prospective prime minister, announced on Tuesday evening that his centre-right SPOLU alliance would lead any new ruling coalition.

Fiala's conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS), part of the SPOLU grouping, has been holding talks with the liberal-progressive Piráti a Starostové (Pirates & Mayors) alliance.

ODS announced on Twitter that the two liberal-conservative alliances would sign a coalition deal when parliament convenes next Monday.

"We have agreed on a coalition agreement and what our coalition programme will look like," Fiala told reporters.

"We want to sign the coalition agreement on November 8. We have agreed on the structure of the government."

However, the country's President Miloš Zeman is yet to officially give the parties a mandate to form a new executive.

President Zeman, 77, remains in hospital and little is publicly known about his condition.

Fiala said on Facebook that the president's chief of staff told him that Zeman was "looking forward to meeting" with the ODS once he is transferred from intensive care.

 

If the president is unable to give the green light to a new government, the Czech parliament may vote to revoke Zeman's powers.

Zeman could also delay the new government by asking ally and incumbent Prime Minister Andrej Babiš to lead a new government.

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Czech Republic - Transparency.org

Transparency International Czech Republic (TIC)

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ALACs provide free and confidential legal advice and allow people to safely report corruption.

Country data

Corruption Perceptions Index

2022 Rank

41/180

2022 Score

56/100

Since its inception in 1995, the Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International’s flagship research product, has become the leading global indicator of public sector corruption. The index offers an annual snapshot of the relative degree of corruption by ranking countries and territories from all over the globe. In 2012, Transparency International revised the methodology used to construct the index to allow for comparison of scores from one year to the next.

Learn more about the CPI

Global Corruption Barometer

29%

Percentage of people who thought corruption increased in the previous 12 months*

11%

Percentage of public service users paid a bribe in the previous 12 months*

*Since the most recent publication of the GCB - European Union

Since its debut in 2003, the Global Corruption Barometer has surveyed the experiences of everyday people confronting corruption around the world. Through our barometer, tens of thousands of people around the globe are asked about their views and experiences, making it the only worldwide public opinion survey on corruption.

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Monitoring public contracting: Experience from 18 integrity pacts in the EU

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This publication sets out key facts, figures and achievements from the integrity pacts in the EU between 2016 and 2021.

Integrity pacts in the EU: Suitability, set up and implementation

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Between 2015 and 2021, 15 civil society organisations monitored 46 public contracting procedures in the EU. This experience and learnings now help us to understand how to…

Global Corruption Barometer: European Union 2021

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The Global Corruption Barometer – European Union is the largest, most detailed set of public opinion data on people’s views and experiences of corruption and bribery in all 27 EU…

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Building on the EU Directive for Whistleblower Protection

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To support effective implementation of the EU's Whistleblower Protection Directive, we have prepared this analysis, which provides recommendations aimed at closing loopholes and…

Blog

A whistleblower and a stack of papers in front of a building

Small steps to lasting transformation: How Integrity Pacts advance institutional change

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Transparency Int'l
A whistleblower and a stack of papers in front of a building

Small steps to lasting transformation: How Integrity Pacts advance institutional change

Transparency International logo
Transparency Int'l
Protesters holding signs against Czech PM Andrej Babiš and his company Agrofert

Data don't lie

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Transparency Int'l

 

Is the approaching Czech whistleblower protection an illusion?

Petr Leyer
A whistleblower and a stack of papers in front of a building

Small steps to lasting transformation: How Integrity Pacts advance institutional change

Transparency International logo
Transparency Int'l
Protesters holding signs against Czech PM Andrej Babiš and his company Agrofert

Data don't lie

Transparency International logo
Transparency Int'l

Is the approaching Czech whistleblower protection an illusion?

Petr Leyer
An aerial view of a small town in Czech Republic

Exposing the truth to save taxpayers’ money

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Transparency Int'l
 

Press releases

Exporting Corruption 2022: Enforcement against foreign bribery hits historic low

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Leading organisations release open letter: Open up company and beneficial ownership registers across Europe

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People in the EU concerned about government corruption, ties between business and politics, survey reveals

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Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš now listed as beneficial owner of Agrofert’s German subsidiary

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Czech Republic Corruption Index & Rank 2023 | Take-profit.org
 

CZECH REPUBLIC CORRUPTION INDEX AND RANK

CZECH REPUBLIC CORRUPTION DATA

Indicator Data Period
Corruption Index 56 index points 2022
Corruption Rank 41 place 2022
 

WHAT IS CORRUPTION INDEX IN CZECH REPUBLIC?

  • Corruption Perceptions Index in Czech Republic increased to 56 index points in 2022. The maximum level was 59 index points and minimum was 37 index points.
  • Data published Yearly by Transparency International.

Historical Data (index points) by years

 

LATEST DATA ON CORRUPTION INDEX (INDEX POINTS)

 
 

Historical Data (index points) by years

Data
Period
Date
 
56 2022 31.01.2023
54 2021 04.04.2022
54 2020 02.02.2021
56 2019 23.01.2020
59 2018 29.01.2019
57 2017 22.03.2018
55 2016 11.08.2017


HISTORICAL CHART BY PRESIDENTS (INDEX POINTS)

 Corruption Index Milos Zeman

CORRUPTION INDEX IN CZECH REPUBLIC BY PRESIDENTS

NAME PERIOD START DATA END DATA MAX VALUE MIN VALUE CHG% START/END
Milos Zeman 08.03.2013 - 55.0000 57.0000 57.0000 55.0000 3.64%

Other business indicators in Czech Republic

Index Updated Actual Previous
Business Confidence Sep/23 89.4 in. pt. 93.9
Ease of Doing Business 2019 41 place 35
Manufacturing PMI Sep/23 41.7 in. pt. 42.9
Manufacturing Production Aug/23 -0.5 % -1.1
Competitiveness Index 2019 70.85 in. pt. 71.18
Corporate Profits 2021 13.657 B USD 10.505

Corruption Index in other countries